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Foreword
Our energy systems, and in particular our electricity systems, in Ireland and
Europe are undergoing almost revolutionary change at present. This has been
driven by the need to address climate challenges, developments in generation
technology and the increasing application of information and communications
to the sector.
At the same time, energy remains central to the operation of our economy.
The policy goals shared by Ireland and the EU of access to secure, sustainable
and, from a global competitiveness perspective, affordable energy have not
changed.
In relation to electricity, the key energy vector for the future, the EU has
decided that it should be delivered on a competitive basis and has set down
the general rules for this. The intention is to make electricity as competitive
as possible, but there are major risks if the design is flawed.
These developments open up a whole new vista for those involved in the
sector and, for me, make it a hugely interesting area to research.
Interconnection is one important aspect of a competitive electricity market.
Interconnection is costly but justified based on modelling of the costs and
benefits it delivers. The research area chosen examined the assumptions
underpinning electricity interconnection in the specific context of the all-island
market (The Single Electricity Market, SEM) and the electricity market of
Great Britain (The British Electricity and Transmission Arrangements, BETTA).
The purpose was to answer the questions: Have the expected benefits been
delivered and, if different from expected what has caused this? Are there
implications for future interconnection or market design?
Getting the design wrong will have major implications in terms of consumer
prices, economically efficient electricity trading and, as a consequence of
both, overall economic development on the island.
The study is, by its nature, open-ended as no decisions have been taken as
yet in relation to the re-design of the Single Electricity Market (SEM). More
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detailed analysis, involving application of the PLEXOS model could add further
insights but has not been undertaken due to the limited time available.
I would like to thank the following people who contributed to the completion
of this research;


My Supervisor, Dr. Martin Barrett for his support and encouragement
during this project. At many stages in the course of this research
project I benefited from his advice, particularly so when exploring new
ideas. His careful feedback contributed enormously to the production of
this thesis.



The interviewees who participated in this research. Their insights into
the Energy Trading sector were vital components to the research and I
would like to thank them for their immense generosity with their time.



Other members of my class, for gladly assisting with advice and
feedback.



My family and friends; for their kind dedication and patience while
completing this research and for all their help and support during my
college tenure.
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Glossary of Terms
AI, All Island; This term shall be used throughout the document to describe
the All Island electricity system which combines the systems in the Republic
of Ireland and Northern Ireland
AMP, The Auction Management Platform is a computerised system that
provides the necessary mechanisms and outputs to facilitate trading across
Moyle and EWIC.
BETTA, British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements
BSC, Balance and Settlement Code
CER, Commission for Energy Regulation
CPF, Carbon Price Floor
EIL, Eirgrid Interconnector Ltd.
EU, European Union
EWIC, East West Interconnector
FTR, Financial Transmission Right
GB, Great Britain
IA, Interconnector Administrator
MIL, Moyle Interconnector Limited
Ofgem, Office of Gas and Electricity Markets
PCR, Price Coupling of Regions initiative
PTR, Physical Transmission Right
ROI, Republic of Ireland
SEM, Single Electricity Market
SO, System Operator
SMP, System Marginal Price
SONI, System Operator Northern Ireland
TSO, Transmission System Operator
UR, Utility Regulator, Regulates the electricity and gas markets in Northern
Ireland
xi

Abstract
Economic trading across electricity interconnectors is considered to be a key
factor in delivering the economic welfare benefits of an integrated European
electricity market. This research examines this assumption as it applies to
the interconnection between the electricity markets in Ireland, Northern
Ireland and Great Britain.
In doing so it reviews the assumption of
economically rational trading behaviour by participants in the market. This
assumption underpinned the cost benefit studies justifying construction of the
East-West interconnector. Actual patterns of trading that have arisen post
commissioning are compared with projected rational behaviour.
The research also considers the consequences of these behavioural
differences for the Single Electricity Market re-design project which the
Regulatory Authorities on the island are undertaking at present.
The analysis relies on an evaluation and examination of the trading patterns
of different operators in the market and also on interviews with selected
participants. It concludes that a simple assumption of economically rational
behaviour based on apparent price differences between markets can be
misleading given a range of other commercial risks apply in the real world.

xii

1 Introduction
By removing barriers and setting fair rules for cross-border exchanges in
electricity, the EU plans to forge a competitive and transparent wholesale
electricity market with a high level of security of supply that serves the
interests of electricity consumers and increases the welfare of European
citizens (SEM Committee, 2012).
Across Europe, national energy policies are being shaped by the European
Internal Energy Market. The ultimate goal of the European Internal Energy
Market is a situation where consumers in any member state can purchase
their energy from any supplier in the European Union (EU).

Figure 1.1 Three maps showing the move from traditional national energy markets to
intermediary regional markets and finally to the EU’s ultimate goal of a pan-European
market, Source (EMCC)

A ‘Target Market Model’ has been designed to facilitate compatible cross
border trading arrangements between Member States and all Member States
are required to comply with this model by 2014.
Owing to its centralised structure and gross mandatory pool design the
magnitude of change required for the SEM to implement the target model is
considerably greater than other markets in Europe (SEM Committee, 2012).
For this reason a two year transitional period has been provided. The revised
SEM, which must be implemented by 2016, is currently being referred to as
1

the Integrated Single Electricity Market, I-SEM. According to the SEM
Committee established to oversee the transition, I-SEM should facilitate more
efficient trade across borders and further serve to bring together electricity
prices across the two islands (Ireland and GB) and the wider EU.
The infrastructure necessary to facilitate this trade is referred to as
interconnection.
By offering cross border access to market participants, interconnection has
the potential to increase competitiveness and commercial opportunities;
ensure greater security of supply; provide important ancillary services such as
frequency response, reactive power and black start capability in addition to
theoretically facilitating growth in renewable energy.
‘Without interconnection, Ireland will not participate in the internal market,
but instead be characterised as a small closed electricity system catering for a
few million people and a smaller number of businesses (Gorecki, 2011).’
However, the theory which describes the welfare benefits of Interconnection is
based on a number of assumptions which may not reflect the unfolding
reality. This study will examine how the reality has diverged from these
assumptions and what impact that has had on expected results.

2

1.1 Research Background and Context
This

section

understanding

offers
the

an

introduction

context

of

this

to

three

study.

areas
First

that are

the

theory

key

to

behind

interconnection will be presented, next the infrastructure necessary to
facilitating interconnection will be described and finally, an overview of the
two connected markets in question will be presented.
1.1.1

Theoretical Rationale for Interconnection

1.1.1.1 Economic Welfare Benefits
At its simplest level, the theory of cross-border electricity trade is broadly
similar to that of international trade in general.
The following simple two-node example illustrates how trade between two
countries should theoretically increase overall welfare.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the supply and demand curves for two countries before
trade.

Figure 1.2 Supply Demand Curves for two theoretical electricity markets before
interconnection, Adapted from (Turvey, 2006)

3

Before trade, the price equilibrium in country A is PA, which is lower than PB,
the marginal price of electricity in country B. The theory of interconnection
assumes that the cost of production of electricity is therefore lower in country
A and thus more efficient.
In this example, a cross-border electricity interconnector with capacity K is
constructed and country B imports quantity K of electricity from country A.
The result is a fall in price in country B to PB*, while in A, the marginal cost of
generation rises due to increased production resulting in a rise in the price of
electricity for consumers in A from PA to PA* as illustrated in Figure 1.3.

Figure 1.3 Illustration of Impact of interconnection on marginal price in country A
and B, Adapted from (Turvey, 2006)

Examining figure 1.4 we can see that there has been a total loss of consumer
surplus in country A of area (a + b). Producers in Country A however now
have access to a wider market and we can observe that as a result, there
have been producer gains of (a + b+ c). As producer gain is greater than
consumer loss, it

is stated that there is a net welfare

gain from

Interconnection for country A of area (c).
4

In country B there has been a loss of producer surplus of (d), but a gain in
consumer surplus of area (d + e + f); there is thus a net welfare gain of (e +
f) for country B.
So while there is redistribution of a, b and d between the consumers and
producers of the two countries, there is overall, a net welfare gain from trade
of (c + e + f).

Figure 1.4 Illustration of theoretical net impact of interconnection on welfare,
adapted from (Turvey, 2006)

The interconnector provider in this example gains rents for use of the
interconnector of (PB* - PA*) x K.
It is generally accepted that the incremental benefits of interconnection
decrease with each subsequent interconnector (EirGrid, 2009)
This example highlights the reason why individual Member States may be for
or against increased interconnection, depending on their original wholesale
electricity prices and those of potential trading partners. However, the
European Commission (EC) sees the potential for net welfare gains for the EU
as a whole. As a central body, the EC is in a freer position to advocate trade
however

Individual

Member

States,

in

particular

national

regulatory
5

authorities (NRAs) who generally have duties to protect the interest of
consumers within their respective countries, may not be keen to see
consumer prices rise if they are in the country where production costs are
initially lower (Jacottet, 2012).
1.1.1.2 Additional Welfare Effects of Interconnection
Interconnection has the potential to offer a range of benefits in addition to the
direct economic welfare benefits outlined above. The following benefits are
commonly referred to in the literature;
1. Enhanced Security of Supply
2. Provision of ancillary services such as frequency response, reactive
power and black start capability
3. Promotion of competition
4. Facilitation of Renewable Generation
5. Reduction in required operating reserve.
These benefits, combined with the potential for direct economic welfare gains
(illustrated in section 1.1.1.1) broadly speaking explain the motivation for
interconnection of the SEM and BETTA electricity markets.
As wholesale electricity prices in the SEM have historically been higher than
GB, Irish consumers are positioned to gain most from Interconnection
according to this theory.
1.1.2

All Island Current and Future Installed Interconnector Capacity

The island of Ireland is connected to Great Britain by two High Voltage DC
(HVDC) submarine interconnectors; The East-West Interconnector and The
Moyle Interconnector. Combined, they represent approximately 10% of allisland electricity demand (EirGrid Group, 2013). GB is further connected to
mainland Europe via the 1000 MW BritNed Interconnector to the Netherlands
and the 2000 MW IFA Interconnector to France.
1.1.2.1 The Moyle Interconnector
The Moyle Interconnector owned and managed by Moyle Interconnector Ltd.
(part of Northern Irish company Mutual Energy), commenced commercial
operation in 2002. It comprises a dual monopole HVDC link with two coaxial
sub-sea cables from Ballycronan More in Islandmagee, Northern Ireland to
6

Auchencrosh in Ayrshire, Scotland (EirGrid & SONI, 2013). The link has a
physical installed capacity of 500MW. Moyle originally had an import capacity
of 450 MW and an export capacity of 295 MW, however a fault on one of the
cables has reduced this to 250 MW in both directions since 2012. Issues with
transmission access rights in Scotland may further limit its export capacity to
80 MW from 2017 (Eirgrid & SONI, 2014).
1.1.2.2 The East-West Interconnector
The East-West Interconnector links converter stations at Rush North Beach,
Dublin with Barkby Beach in North Wales. The Interconnector, developed,
owned and managed by EirGrid Interconnector Ltd. (EIL) and co-financed by
the EU has been in full commercial operation since May 2013, and has the
capability of importing or exporting up to 500 MW at any given moment. It is
not easy to predict whether or not imports for the full 500 MW will be
available at all time however and EirGrid has estimated the capacity value of
the interconnector to be 440 MW in their most recent generation adequacy
study (EirGrid & SONI, 2014). EWIC uses Voltage Source Converter (VSC)
technology and is the largest capacity VSC interconnector in operation
worldwide (EirGrid, 2014). The East West Interconnector represents an
investment of approximately €580 million. EirGrid were granted a loan of up
to €300 million from the European Investment Bank and the balance of the
project was funded by a combination of further capital investment from
commercial banks, EirGrid equity and a €110 million grant from the European
Commission (CER, 2012).
1.1.2.3 Proposed Interconnection
A

number

of

studies

have

attempted

to

project

how

much

further

interconnection is viable and of benefit to the SEM. This issue will be
discussed further in the literature review. At present however, any plans for
additional interconnection are still in the preliminary phase.
In 2013, EirGrid and its French counterpart RTE (Réseau de Transport
d’Électricité) signed a Memorandum of Understanding to begin preliminary
studies on the feasibility of building a submarine electricity interconnector
between Ireland and France. An Ireland-France interconnector would, if
developed, run between the South coast of Ireland and the North West coast
7

of France.

According to a Press Release from Eirgrid in June 2013, the

capacity of the Ireland-France interconnector could be approximately 700 MW
(EirGrid, 2013).
1.1.2.3.1 Interconnection infrastructure exclusively for Export of
Renewables
Several developers have proposed large-scale renewable energy export
projects in Ireland that would access the GB market by connecting directly to
its transmission system via one or more High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC)
links (National Grid & EirGrid, 2013). These proposed projects have however
come up against a number of obstacles and their status is currently unknown.
A number of studies have explored the benefits of connecting Irish renewable
energy projects to GB via an integrated network solution. A 2013 joint EirGrid
- National Grid study reported the estimated annual benefits of such a project
to be €75m per annum. At present however this type of connection does not
fit into the existing regulatory framework for either GB or Ireland (National
Grid & EirGrid, 2013).

1.1.3

SEM Vs. BETTA: High level overview

While the theory behind interconnection is relatively simple, the fundamental
differences between the SEM and BETTA markets presents a significant
challenge to optimising trade over the Moyle and East West Interconnectors.
The Single Electricity Market (SEM) is the wholesale electricity market
operating on the island of Ireland. It operates as a gross mandatory pool
market, into which all electricity generated on or imported onto the island of
Ireland must be sold, and from which all wholesale electricity for consumption
on or export from the island of Ireland must be purchased (EirGrid, 2014)
The British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) is the
wholesale electricity market operating in Great Britain. It operates as a
bilateral trading market between generators, suppliers and energy traders.
There are also power exchanges available in Great Britain which facilitate
further trade in the BETTA market (EirGrid, 2014).
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The key differences with respect to bidding, pricing, price visibility and
capacity payments between the SEM and BETTA markets are summarised in
figure 1.2.

Figure 1.5 Comparison of the components of SEM and BETTA (EirGrid & SONI, 2014)

Chapter three will go into further detail on the difference between the SEM
and BETTA, however two of the key differences with respect to economic
trade across the interconnection will be highlighted here given their
significance. These are;
1. Real Time Price Firmness: A consequence of the SEM design is that the
final System Marginal Price, paid to generators, and by suppliers, is not
known until four days after trading. This presents a high level of risk for
anybody trading between the SEM and other markets. In interviews
with Interconnector Users, the SMP was described as being ‘notoriously
hard to predict’.
2. Capacity Payment Regime: In accordance with SEM regulations,
capacity payments are provided to imported electricity but deducted
from exports to GB. There is currently no capacity payment mechanism
in place in GB.
3. Gate Window Closures: As will be explained in Chapter 3, in the SEM
there are just three opportunities for market participants submit data
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to the market operators for use in the associated marginal price
software run. Two gate closures occur occur the day before trading
(each closing 90 minutes before the relevant software run) and one
gate closure occurs on the day of trading, 90 minutes before the Within
Day software run. Gate closures occur on an hourly basis in GB.
1.2 Research Selection Rationale
Interconnectors are a key part of the physical infrastructure that is required in
order to deliver the concept of a single Internal Electricity Market in the EU.
The value of interconnection is based on assumptions regarding their use,
including that of rational economic behaviour by those trading.
Studies supporting the East-West interconnector in advance of its construction
projected a positive benefit for consumers in Ireland. It is of value to review
the actual results against those projected and identify the possible causes for
differences form original projections. It is also of interest to examine if the
reasons for these differences may also have implications or the redesign of
the SEM.

1.3 Main Aims and Key Objectives
1.3.1

Key Objectives

There are three key aims to this study. They are listed with their associated
objectives below:

Aims

Objectives
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1. Examine interconnector flows

1a. Collect, organise and analyse SEMO

between the SEM/All-island (AI)

Interconnector Flow Data to identify trends in

and BETTA markets

volumes and direction over time and by type of
trade.
1b. Identify trading patterns and strategies of
Interconnector Users
2a. Compare findings with assumptions
underpinning previous studies.

2. Determine whether the actual
utilisation of the interconnectors;

2b. Assess whether EWIC is reducing SMP

corresponds with preinterconnector delivery projections;
2c. Assess whether EWIC is helping us to achieve
renewable targets
3. Consider the reasons for any

3a. Analyse results and determine whether there is

variances that have arisen under

a connection between the difference in assumed

the current SEM market

trading patterns and the differences in results.

arrangements and what lessons
can be provided in terms of
developing the revised I-SEM
market

Table 1.1 Thesis aims and associated objectives.

1.4 Dissertation Scope and Limitations
This

study

examines

electricity

flows

on

and

East-West

interconnectors and the behaviour of those engaged in trading.

It utilises

publicly available data to determine these.

the

Moyle

The study also researched
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opinions form those actively engaged in trading on the interconnector and the
East-West interconnector operator.
Data analysis was therefore necessarily limited to that available.

It would

have been of interest to undertake a number of modelling runs using the
modelling tool (PLEXOS) used originally to assess the interconnector benefits
with modified assumptions in the light of actual experience. In the absence of
this the results and conclusions are more qualitative.
While interviews were conducted with a number of individuals the sample was
not fully representative of all parties trading on the interconnector.

As a

result it has the potential to be biased although enquiries were constructed to
minimise this possibility.
The scope of work that could be undertaken was also limited by the time
available; some sections of the analysis could only be applied to one month
given time restrictions, analysis of a longer time period would have offered
more comprehensive results.
1.5 Dissertation Structure
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the research topic including the policy
background, rationale for electricity trading, market structures in Ireland (AI)
and Great Britain and the current status of interconnection between the
markets in both regions.
Chapter 2 present a literature review of key aspects of this study including
materials pre and post completion of the East-West interconnector.
Chapter 3 describes in more detail the design of the markets in Ireland and
Northern Ireland (SEM) and Great Britain (BETTA) and the arrangements for
trading across the interconnectors.
Chapter 4 examines the possible implications for interconnector trading of
upcoming changes to the SEM, which are intended to improve the economic
efficiency of such trading.
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Chapter 5 describes the methodology used in researching this thesis and
identifies the data sources and approximations used to determine results.
The results and discussion are presented in Chapter 6. These compare the
projected behaviours anticipated before construction of the East-West
interconnector with those observed subsequently.

The implications for the

restructured SEM are also addressed.
Chapter 7 presents the conclusions of this thesis, describe the degree to
which the original objectives were achieved and indicates possible further
areas for study.

1.6 Original Contribution
The following analyses constitute work the author has not found to be
previously published;
-

Disaggregation of trading on the GB-SEM interconnectors.
Identification and classification of trading behaviours across the
Moyle and East West Interconnectors.
Analysis of the differences between forecasted and actual trading
behaviours across the Moyle and East West Interconnectors.
Analysis of possible implications resulting from this behavioural
difference for the development of I-SEM.
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2 Literature Review
This literature review will focus on a number of key aspects that will support a
proper understanding of the relevant factors relating to this research topic of
Interconnection between the SEM and its neighbouring countries, including
the basis on which it was justified, it’s projected and actual impact on
wholesale prices and its ability to facilitate renewables.
Note that a review of the relevant literature associated with the following
topics has been undertaken and referenced in the relevant chapters;


General Theory of Interconnection (Chapter 1)



Trading Across the Interconnector; The Fundamentals (Chapter X)



The Integrated European Electricity Market (Chapter X)



Barriers to Trade and ability of proposed I-SEM Changes to Address
them (Chapter X –includes review of I-SEM Consultation responses)

As such, these topics are not repeated here.
In addition to researching literature specifically related to interconnection and
the SEM, this review is also informed by related international research so as
to provide a broader context to this work.
2.1 Economic Welfare Gains from Interconnection in the SEM
2.1.1

Analysis prior to EWIC Project Completion

In the years preceding the East West Interconnector Project, several reports
examining the impact of increased interconnection on production costs and
electricity prices in the SEM were published. These reports broadly agreed
that the proposed 500 MW of interconnection would have the effect of
reducing the wholesale price of electricity in the SEM but results diverged on
the extent of the reduction and on the impact of further interconnection after
EWIC on economic welfare in the SEM.
Valari (2008) projected the effects of additional interconnection between
Ireland and GB using a static optimal dispatch model in a study published by
the ESRI. The analysis was based on 2005 fuel prices and generation plant
mix and assumed perfect competition in wholesale generation markets. As the
basic theory of Interconnection would predict, Valeri found that in general,
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‘Ireland enjoys larger net benefits than Great Britain with interconnection’
(Valeri, Working Paper No. 232, 2008). In all scenarios considered she found
that Irish consumers were always the group that gained the most and Irish
producers the group that lost the most.
Again, consistent with Interconnector Theory, the sum of Irish and British
social welfare was found to increase with interconnection, although at a
decreasing rate. Table 2.1 summarises the annual welfare changes for the
Interconnector owner and consumers and producers in GB and Ireland that
were predicted by Valeri’s model for various incremental increases in installed
interconnector capacity.
Table 2.1 Annual welfare changes in million euro, 2005 prices, Source (Valeri,
Working Paper No. 232, 2008)

The following year, EirGrid conducted their own Economic Feasibility Report to
assess the costs and benefits of further interconnection to GB or France. Their
results forecast that the East-West interconnector would bring production cost
savings in the range €50-€75 million in 2025 and that an additional 500 MW
interconnector would bring production cost savings in the range of €25 – 50
million. A High Renewables generation portfolio resulted in the greatest
savings from additional interconnection in this report.
EirGrid’s results showed that marginal prices on the island of Ireland would be
reduced by the addition of smaller amounts of interconnection to the system
(500 MW), however, with more interconnection, the picture was mixed and
EirGrid stated it was ‘difficult to draw a conclusion’. The only results presented
with respect to marginal price in this report were estimated marginal price in
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€/MWh for the Base Case scenario for the year 2015. These results were only
presented in graphical form, however we can read from the graph reproduced
in Figure 2.1 that when 500 additional megawatts are added to an existing
installed

500

MW

(representing

Moyle),

Marginal

price

drops

from

approximately 61 €/MWh to 60.28 €/MWh. Thus we can infer that the 2009
EirGrid feasibility study projected a drop in marginal price of just 1.2%
attributable to the increased 500 MW East West Interconnector.

1000 MW

500 MW
Figure 2.1Effect of additional interconnection on marginal price in 2015, Original
graph (EirGrid, 2009), lines representing 500 MW and 1000 MW added to illustrate
impact of Moyle and East West Interconnectors.

In the same year, Pöyry Energy Consulting included an Interconnection
Sensitivity Analysis as part of their multi-client study ‘Implications of
Intermittency’.
A ‘Base Case’ scenario with one interconnector (Moyle) at 400 MW import and
export capacity and a second interconnector (the proposed EWIC) at 1 GW
was compared with a ‘Lower Interconnection’ scenario where export on Moyle
was reduced to 80 MW and EWIC capacity was reduced to 500 MW both ways.
The impact on GB prices was negligible, however the modelling predicted 200
more periods annually of zero or negative prices and 400 more periods of €0
– 20/ MWh prices in the SEM in the core scenario when compared with the
‘lower interconnection’ scenario. Overall, monthly and annual prices in the
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SEM were found to be 1% higher in 2015 and 5.3% higher in 2025 in the
‘lower interconnection’ scenario. The report asserted that this was the result
of ‘stranded wind’. These results do not tally with EirGrid’s 2015 projections
presented in Figure 2.1 which indicate a drop in marginal price of just 0.3%
when AI-GB interconnector capacity is increased beyond 900 MW.
The assumptions underlying all three of these reports have been challenged.
Both the

ESRI

and the

Pöyry studies assumed perfectly functioning

interconnectors at full capacity and EirGrid’s study assumed flows when there
were price differences at both ends of the interconnector. However, a SEM
Committee paper ‘Short to Medium Term Interconnector Issues in the SEM’
produced later that year indicated that these assumptions did not reflect
reality.
This SEM paper was prompted partly by a perception that use of the Moyle
Interconnector had changed significantly after the market restructuring which
occurred in November 2007 and partly by a concern that the rules governing
its use were contributing to security of supply concerns. The paper recognised
that flows in both directions across Moyle had not responded as fully as they
might have to price arbitrage opportunities between the SEM and BETTA and
identified a number of reasons why this might be the case. These issues
included the availability of capacity on Moyle and its cost, the risks created by
the misalignment of the SEM and BETTA (e.g. gate closure and ex-post
pricing), the lack of liquidity in the day ahead markets and network charging
in GB (SEM Committee, 2009).
While the addition of 500 MW of installed interconnector capacity helped
address the availability issue highlighted in this report and some progress has
been made in terms of regulatory changes, for example, the introduction of a
‘within day’ gate window, many of the fundamental issues hindering economic
use of the interconnector raised in this paper persist.
Denny et al. (2010) also found that an increase in interconnection should
reduce average price, this time, in a context of high penetration of wind. The
results published in the journal Energy Policy in a paper entitled ‘The Impact
of Increased Interconnection on Electricity Systems with Large Penetrations of
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Wind Generation: A case study of Ireland and Great Britain’ also suggested
that increased interconnection would reduce price variability in this context.
This study utilized a stochastic unit commitment model to simulate the
impacts of increased interconnection for the island of Ireland with large
penetrations of wind generation. A number of scenarios were modelled. The
base case assumed 1000 MW of interconnection, Scenario 1 assumed an
increase to 2000 MW coupled with a significant increase in wind penetration
on the GB system (representing a growth in wind in similar proportion to that
assumed in the Irish system). Scenario three modelled the impact of intra-day
trading on the interconnector, with an installed capacity of 2000 MW.
The results of the price analysis are indicated in table 2.2 below.
Table 2.2 Average SMP results from Denny et al 2010 study, Source (Denny, et al.,
2010)

By operating the interconnectors intra-day, the day-ahead prices were
reduced slightly while the intra-day prices in Ireland were significantly
decreased. This was due to being able to use the interconnectors instead of
more expensive peaking units to make up for wind power forecast errors, or
unit outages. The variability of prices was also significantly reduced (Denny,
et al., 2010)

2.1.2

Analysis Post EWIC Project Completion

Limited analysis of the impact of the Moyle and EWIC on wholesale price post
completion of the East West Interconnector has been published.
In Section 6.4 of the All-Island Generation Capacity Statement 2014-2023
published February 2014, results of a study carried out by SEMO are
presented.
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The study examined the first six months of EWIC operation, effectively
rerunning the market schedule for those months and graphing the differential
with and without EWIC in full operation. The results are presented in Figure
2.2 below.
According to this analysis, on average EWIC reduced the SMP by 4 €/ MWh, or
8%, for those months (Eirgrid & SONI, 2014). A result substantially higher
than the 1.4% difference projected for 2015 in EirGrid’s original Feasibility
Report (see figure 2.1).
The report did not include the study methodology.

Figure 2.2Results for Load weighted SMP for May - Oct 2013 with and without EWIC
as presented in the 2014 All-Island Generation Capacity Statement, Source (Eirgrid &
SONI, 2014)

In April 2014, EirGrid conducted their own analysis of EWIC’s impact on
overall production costs and SMP. These are the only studies of the impact of
either the Moyle or East West Interconnector on wholesale price to be
undertaken post project completion.
The results were presented in a press release in April 2014, which reported
that, for the duration of their analysis, there had been an overall 9%
reduction in SMP.

Again, this is a substantially greater reduction than pre

project projections
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Figure 2.3 Press Release Issued by Eirgrid, Source (EirGrid, 2014)

The analysis was based on a comparison of a base case ‘EWIC ON’ scenario
representing EWIC being fully available from May 1st 2013 to April 1st 2014
with an ‘EWIC OFF’ scenario representing an unconnected AI market for the
same period.
The EWIC ON base case scenario was built using actual Unconstrained Unit
Commitment (UUC) EP2 Gate Window data. Within the Central Market System
the unconstrained unit commitment functionality automatically identifies the
units, placing them in their relevant market order according to a bid price per
MW and production costs as well as demand through the Trading day (SEMO,
2014).
A theoretical UUC was built for the EWIC OFF scenario and overall production
cost and SMP were compared.
The study analysed economic dispatch only i.e. constraints, reserves or
otherwise were not considered. The results showed reductions in production
cost and relative average daily savings in SMP of 5.85 €/MWh or 9% on
average over the period studied.
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Figure 2.4 EirGrid 2014 Analysis Results, Load Weighted Average SMP May 1st 2013 April 30th 2014, Source (Campbell, 2014)

To date, no independent analysis of the impact of the EWIC interconnector on
production costs or wholesale price based on real data has been published.
The assumptions underlying the above study will be further explored in
Chapter 6.
2.2 Renewables
Many commentators have highlighted the potential for interconnection to
facilitate the integration of wind generation in power systems by increasing
system flexibility and balancing variable wind output.
Indeed, a fundamental assumption underlying all of the aforementioned ‘Pre
EWIC’ studies and several subsequent publications is that wind is a driving
factor of interconnector flows. Models have been based on the assumption
that increased interconnection will allow Ireland to export wind during high
wind periods and import power from Britain when wind levels are low, with
implications for renewable subsidies, security of supply and renewables
targets.
Goreki (2011) in his analysis of the implications of the EU Electricity market in
Ireland, reminds us that ‘an additional motive for building interconnection is
to utilise wind generated electricity in an optimal manner……

In order to

ensure wind is not unduly curtailed off the system, interconnection is of vital
importance (Gorecki, 2011)’.
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Figure 2.5 shows Pöyry’s projections for interconnector flows and wind
generation in the Irish market for 2030. The flows represented in Figure 2.5
are highly responsive to changing wind output.

Figure 2.5 Pöyry results, Interconnection flows between markets and wind
generation in the Irish market (2030, weather of 2001) Source, (Pöyry Energy
Consulting, 2009)

With respect to renewables, the Pöyry study found that more wind curtailment
would occur in its ‘lower interconnection’ scenario, with the number of trading
periods of wind loss in Ireland increasing from 61 to 222 in 2020 and from
723 to 1,177 in 2030 by comparison with the core scenario. This would lead
to higher carbon emission in the SEM.

The Pöyry study concludes that

interconnection between Britain and the SEM becomes of critical importance
as the volume of installed wind generation increases; observing that the
larger the geographical area that installed wind is spread over, the more
constant and less intermittent the wind generation becomes.
In EirGrid’s 2008 business case for the Interconnector, Environmental benefits
with respect to wind curtailment were valued at €10 million per annum and
the likelihood that these full benefits would arise, based on the premise of
33% renewable penetration, was reported at 100%. Environmental benefits
with respect to reducing the need to carry reserve were valued at €2 million
per annum; again with a 100% likelihood that the full benefit would arise.
Environmental benefits associated with reduced carbon credit payment were
valued at €28 million per annum with a 50% likelihood that the full benefit
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would arise. These were based on annual total energy requirement figures
which have transpired to be much lower than those projected to date.
EirGrid’s 2009 Economic Feasibility Report reaffirmed that interconnection
would reduce wind curtailment, stating that ‘a substantial proportion of the
production cost savings derive from reducing wind curtailment on the island of
Ireland’.
Diffney et al, in their 2009 paper ‘Investment in electricity infrastructure in a
small isolated market: the case of Ireland’ concluded that investment in
interconnection is a sine qua non for high investment in wind, with the former
allowing the latter to generate whenever it is available instead of being
curtailed at times of low demand. The paper cautioned however that
enhanced interconnection between the Irish and British systems must be
managed in a manner that will maximise welfare gains, and noted that this
issue had not been fully considered by policy makers at that time.
The work of Denny et al. challenged prior studies on the issue of curtailment
and emissions. This analysis factored into its model that interconnectors
would be scheduled day-ahead, i.e. that operation would be based on
forecasted values of load and wind output causing a non-optimal transmission
schedule in some operational hours when there were large deviations from
the day – ahead forecast.
It was also acknowledged here that the ability to balance variable wind
depends on the neighbouring system having spare flexibility, which is likely to
be reduced if there is a large amount of wind in both systems.
The results indicated that while increased interconnection improves system
adequacy considerably, with a significant reduction in the number of hours
when the load and reserve constraints are not met, and reduces the balancing
needs for both systems, assuming that they cooperate in providing balancing
reserves, it does not reduce excess wind generation.
This was explained by the fact that under unit commitment techniques which
incorporate

wind

power

forecasts

in

the

scheduling

decisions,

wind

curtailment is minimal even with low levels of interconnection.
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The overall wind production on the Irish system was relatively unchanged in
all three scenarios (described in the previous section). Wind curtailment
changed from a low level of 23 GWh per annum (0.12% of Irish wind
production) in the base case to 30 GWh (0.15%) in scenarios 1 and 2. The
cause of the slight increase in absolute terms was the interconnectors being
scheduled day –ahead.
The study also covered the impact of interconnection on GB, finding that while
increased interconnection may reduce carbon emissions in Ireland, emissions
in GB would not be reduced resulting in total emissions remaining almost
unchanged although this conclusions does not reflect the impact of the EUwide Emissions Trading System (ETS) in fixing emission quantities.
Curtis et al in their 2013 paper ‘Climate policy, interconnection and carbon
leakage: the effects of unilateral UK policy on electricity and GHG emissions in
Ireland’ have updated and built upon these findings although again ignoring
the impact of the EU-wide ETS regime, demonstrating that interconnection
enables carbon leakage, particularly if policies relating to the price of carbon
are misaligned across countries. The authors used a model of the electricity
markets in Ireland and GB to show that GB’s Carbon Price Floor would
increase both electricity prices and greenhouse gas emissions in Ireland.
Their results suggested the introduction of the CPF would make BETTA
generators less competitive compared to the SEM and net exports from the
SEM would increase by 154%. Regulations around the Carbon Floor have
since been changed meaning these predictions are unlikely to be realised,
however, the dramatic results expose the SEM’s vulnerability to changes in
policy in GB.
EirGrid continue to maintain that the interconnector is facilitating growth in
renewable energy.

Their ‘East West Interconnector –One Year On’ report

listed ‘Facilitating growth in renewable energy’ as one of five core benefits.
However, it is possible that they are referring here primarily to TSO Counter
Trading as opposed to facilitation of growth in renewable energy by
commercial interconnector users. In their 2013 Renewables report, EirGrid
group stated that the EWIC is facilitating the increased use of renewable
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energy by helping to reduce the curtailment of renewables through the use of
System Operator trades directly with National Grid Electricity Transmission
(EirGrid Group, 2013)
No analysis of the net contribution of the Interconnectors to the facilitation of
renewable generation and reduction of emissions in the SEM based on real
data has been published to date.

2.3 Impact of Regulatory Decisions in GB on Interconnector Flows
The findings of Curtis et al.’s 2013 paper discussed in section 2.2 indicated
the vulnerability of the SEM market to changes in GB policy.
While the impact of the carbon floor on interconnector flows was not as
extreme as predicted on account of subsequent changes in policy, the ESRI
have more recently published a report (Deane, FitzGerald, Valeri, Tuohy, &
Walsh, 2014) that strongly suggests that the wholesale price in Great Britain
is much lower than in Ireland and in fact too low to cover long run generating
costs making it an unsustainable long-term model.
The study which estimates true costs and price difference for the British
model using the simulation tool PLEXOS, finds that the difference between
wholesale prices in SEM and BETTA is not driven by technological factors.
BETTA consists of firms that are, for the most part, vertically integrated and
therefore have both a generating and a retail function. The study finds that
firms in BETTA not making losses as a result of the low wholesale price, as
they are compensated by large retail margins. This favours incumbents with
established customer bases and makes entry of new generators difficult.
It was also estimated that the cost of supporting renewables per MWh of
electricity consumed is much higher in GB than in Ireland, even though
renewables account for a smaller share of overall consumption. The report
concluded that upward pressure on prices is likely in the future in both
jurisdictions, as both aim to increase the share of renewables in electricity
generation but that the disparity in subsidy costs across jurisdictions should
gradually reduce in size.
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In BETTA there has been a dearth of new thermal plants coming online, unlike
the SEM where there has been extensive new entry with limited ad-hoc
intervention by the regulatory authorities. The report suggests that to
encourage new generating plants to come on board, incentives for investment
in BETTA must grow, suggesting that the gap between SEM and BETTA
wholesale prices will narrow in the future. Their conclusion that some form of
remuneration for capacity is inevitable is supported by the literature and
policy developments emerging from Ofgem with respect to GB Energy Market
Reform.
Changes in the wholesale price in GB and/ or the addition of a capacity
payment mechanism are likely influence the ratio of imports to exports across
the Moyle and East West Interconnector.
2.4 Literature Review Conclusion
As has been discussed, prior to the completion of EWIC several studies using
a range of approaches were undertaken with a view to measuring and
assessing the various impacts of interconnection on the SEM.
It would appear that a number of the key assumptions that underpinned this
body of work do not reflect the reality of trading since the completion of the
EWIC.
According to EirGrid’s own recent analysis, EWIC has been much more
successful at reducing the wholesale price of electricity in Ireland than was
originally anticipated. These results have however not been verified by
independent research. This thesis will attempt to determine the margin of
error for these results.
As discussed, the net impact of the interconnectors on facilitation of
renewables has not yet been formally analysed but the indication from
industry responses to the SEM Committees various consultation documents is
that the current system does not create conditions favourable for arbitrage
trading –i.e. trading that can take advantage of short term price differences,
including those as a result of wind. This would indicate that trading is not
occurring as predicted in the original analyses. This thesis will attempt to
characterise and assess the current patterns of trade across the Moyle and
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East

West

Interconnector.

Understanding

the

trading

behaviour

of

interconnector users should be a vital prerequisite to any future study of
interconnector performance and impact.
If it is found that these patterns are sub-optimal, this thesis will attempt to
determine what the barriers to optimal trading are and which of the new
options being proposed as part of I-SEM can best address them.
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3 Trading Across the Interconnector; The
Fundamentals
This chapter will begin with an explanation of the SEM and BETTA markets.
Their key differences with respect to interconnection are then assessed.
In section 3.4 the process of trading over the interconnectors is outlined, this
section draws from published guides to trading and using the Auction
Management Platform, Access Agreements for the respective interconnectors
and interviews with Market Participants.
The allocation arrangements for Moyle and EWIC currently prescribe that
transmission and energy markets are separated. The process of how physical
transmission rights are auctioned and traded in advance of energy markets is
explained.

3.1 The SEM
3.1.1

How does it work?

The SEM is the wholesale market for the island of Ireland, regulated jointly by
the Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) and its counterpart in Belfast,
the Utility Regulator. It is structured as a compulsory pool market with
capacity payments.
The rules of the all-Island Single Electricity Market (SEM) are detailed in the
Trading and Settlement Code (TSC) written by the regulatory authorities in
Ireland.
Under the code, all price making generators (with an installed capacity larger
than 10 MW) must bid their short run costs into the pool. Electricity suppliers
purchase electricity from the pool to cover their consumer’s demand for each
half hour period throughout the day.
Once generators have submit their bids to the Single Electricity Market
Operator (SEMO), an initial software run is conducted to determine a Market
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Schedule which forecasts the System Marginal Price (SMP) for each half hour
trading period.
The SMP, calculated by the Market Scheduling and Pricing (MSP) software is
set by the most expensive generator required to meet supplier demand in a
half hour trading period, as illustrated in figure 3.1. All generators who
produce electricity in a trading period (that is, all generators including and to
the left of the marginal plant in figure 3.1) receive the SEM pool price for that
period, which for most generators is greater than their short term cost of
producing electricity. Where generator bids are below the SMP, the difference
between the price that generator bids into the pool (their short run marginal
cost) and the final ‘System Marginal Price’ all successful generators are paid is
referred to as the infra marginal rent. The infra marginal rent, also referred to
as the uplift component allows a generator to cover its start-up costs.

Figure 3.1 Determining the SMP (CER, 2011)

As wind generators do not consume fuel they have no short term costs and
hence can bid a zero price to the SEM. As price takers in the SEM, they
receive the SMP set by the most expensive generator for their output in that
half hour trading period (Clifford & Clancy, 2011).
There are five runs of the MSP Software in respect of each Trading Day; three
runs: Ex-Ante One (EA1), Ex-Ante Two (EA2) and Within Day One (WD1)
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prior to the end of the Trading Day and two after the trading day when
accurate data has been received: Ex-Post Indicative (EP1) and Ex-Post Initial
(EP2) (CER, 2013).
The final SMP which is paid to generators and by suppliers is calculated by the
final SMP software run EP2 which occurs four days after the trading date. The
EP2 run which produces this figure accounts for real time factors such as
changes in customer demand or wind generation (CER, 2011). This SMP is the
energy component of the total cost of producing electricity.
Other market payments are made to generators to ensure that the system
has adequate generation capacity in to the future. These payments are called
capacity payments. The capacity price and the market SMP price represent
the average long term cost of producing electricity in the SEM (Clifford &
Clancy, 2011).
In order to maintain a safe and secure power system the Transmission
System Operator (TSO) may have to deviate from the generation schedule
created by the SEM. This creates additional costs to the system, called
Dispatch Balancing Costs, commonly known as constraints costs (Clifford &
Clancy, 2011).
The SEM will require significant modifications to implement the Target Model.
The magnitude of change required for the SEM to achieve this is considerably
greater than most other markets in Europe. This is due to its centralised,
gross mandatory pool design which differs in a number of key respects from
the prevailing market design in most other European Member States
(Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation, 2013).

3.1.2

Key Parties from an Interconnector Perspective

The Trading and Settlement Code (TSC) describes how trading is carried out
on the island of Ireland and includes rules around how trading should take
place across the interconnectors within the SEM.
The TSC refers to three main parties with respect to the Interconnector; The
Interconnector

Administrator

(IA),

The

Market

Operator

(MO)

and
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Interconnector Units (IUs). The roles of these three parties with respect to the
SEM are summarised below;
1. The IA is responsible for the administration of trading between
jurisdictions. The designated IA for EWIC and Moyle is the System
Operator for Northern Ireland (SONi).
As IA, SONi facilitates capacity allocation and energy trading on the
interconnectors via the Auction Management Platform (AMP) which is
compatible with both SEM and BETTA arrangements. The AMP is a
computerised system that provides the necessary mechanisms and
outputs to facilitate trading across Moyle and EWIC. The AMP is
currently hosted by UNICORN systems in the Czech Republic.
2. The MO represents any party or system that manages the market
place. The Single Electricity Market Operator (SEMO) is the designated
market operator for the All Island SEM.
3. Interconnector Units (IUs) or Interconnector Users represent any party
that trades on the interconnectors via the SEM. Each Interconnector
User must register a single Interconnector Unit, which is the entity
against which the user trades in capacity and energy.

EirGrid and SONI are the respective System Operators for Ireland and
Northern Ireland and the Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) and
Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation are the respective Energy
Regulators.
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Figure 3.2 Graphic of EWIC and Moyle Interconnector Stakeholders, Source (CER,
2013)

3.2 BETTA
3.2.1

How does it work?

The British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) is the
wholesale electricity market operating in Great Britain.
It operates as a bilateral trading market between generators, suppliers and
energy traders. The trading process is summarised below.
Futures and Forwards Market
‘Over the counter’ bilateral trades between sellers and buyers constitute the
majority of trading within the BETTA market.
The Grid Trading Master Agreement is the standard contract on which BETTA
trades are based.
Power Exchange
The Power Exchange gives electricity suppliers and customers the opportunity
to fine tune their position as more accurate information becomes available
about their demand requirements.
Gate Closure
The power exchange closes one hour before real time operation. This is
known as gate closure. At this point, all participants must submit their final
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physical notification of their forecast of expected demand or supply to the
system operator.
Following this, bids (to reduce generation or increase demand) and offers (to
reduce demand or increase generation) can then be submitted to the System
Operator (National Grid).
Balancing Mechanism
The balancing mechanism allows the System Operator to ensure that the
systems balance during each half hour of real time operation. The bids and
offers submitted at gate closure are used to achieve this. The Balancing
Mechanism operates from gate closure until real time operation. Should a
participant be out of balance at gate closure, they will be subject to the
imbalance cash-out price. The penalties for imbalance are high and, as such,
this mechanism is seen within the industry as a last resort (HM Revenue &
Customs, 2012).
Settlement
Settlement takes place post real time operation. This is where the system
operator calculates the participant’s settlement.

Figure 3.3 Trading and Settlement Timeline following hourly Gate Closure (Elexon,
2013)

National Grid (NG) is the System Operator for GB and the Commission for
Regulation and Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) acts as Energy
Regulator.
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3.2.2

Key Parties from an Interconnector Perspective

The Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) describes the trading arrangements
for Great Britain and requires formal interfacing roles to be undertaken by the
Interconnector Administrator (SONi, 2014). The company Elexon administers
the BSC and provides and procures the services needed to implement it.
Under the BSC, the IA (who is the same for both the SEM and BETTA) is
responsible for the administration of trading between jurisdictions including
management and settlement of IC power imbalances in GB.
The IA must submit ‘Physical Notifications’ (PNs) to the Transmission
Company on behalf of participants as well as submitting energy allocations to
the Market Operator.

3.3 SEM Vs BETTA; Summary of Market Differences
3.3.1

Pricing and Price Visibility

In the SEM, all generators and suppliers receive and pay the same wholesale
price for electricity, the SMP. In BETTA, the price of power purchased through
bilateral contracts is generally not disclosed. The price of power sold through
power exchanges is set by the most expensive unit cleared, and these prices
are publicly available (Eirgrid & SONI, 2014).
In BETTA, participants know what price they will pay or receive for power in
advance of delivery. In the SEM, the final price is calculated after actual
power delivery to account for unforeseen changes such as generator failure,
changes in wind or demand forecasts, etc. For this reason, participants do not
know the final price until four days after the power has been delivered.
3.3.2

Capacity Payments

As outlined above, all generators in the SEM receive capacity payments based
on their availability to run. Total payment each year is fixed by the regulators.
Interconnector users importing into the SEM receive SMP and Capacity
Payments based on flows. Interconnector Users exporting out from SEM pay
SMP and Capacity Payments based on flows (Lawlor, 2012). Capacity
payments do not exist in GB as of yet, and so these extra payments tend to
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increase the price differential between the two markets, making it more
attractive to import to the SEM from BETTA (Eirgrid & SONI, 2014).
However, the British Government is attempting to deal with the issue of
future supply shortages by promoting investment into electricity generation
through an initiative known as ‘Electricity Market Reform’ (EMR). A key
component of EMR is the introduction of a capacity market.
The structure of these capacity payments is currently under consultation, and
it is uncertain how this might affect trading between the two markets (Eirgrid
& SONI, 2014).

3.3.3

Generation by Fuel Type

Figure 3.4 illustrates SEM and BETTA generation portfolio composition.

Figure 3.4 Comparison of the generation in both regions by fuel type, Source: (Eirgrid
& SONI, 2014)

The most striking differences in plant portfolio between the two markets are
1) BETTA’s higher proportion of coal plant and 2) their significant level of
nuclear generation. The price of coal is currently low compared to gas, and
nuclear power plants have a low short-run marginal cost. This tends to result
in a lower cost of generating electricity in BETTA relative to the SEM. In
addition, most gas in SEM is transported through the UK and as such is more
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expensive, further increasing the difference in generation costs between the
two regions (Eirgrid & SONI, 2014).
3.3.4

Forecasting Future Flows

As outlined in the literature review, prices in BETTA have to date on average
been lower than those in the SEM, particularly once capacity payments are
included. This is illustrated in Figure 3.5, which compares 2013 prices from
the two regions. The price difference is negligible at night time and is most
noticeable around the evening peak, when uplift tends to form a larger
component of the SMP.

Figure 3.5 Comparison of the SMP in SEM and APX prices (which represent the
opportunity cost of power in BETTA) FOR 2013. SMP values are shown with and
without capacity prices added on. Source: (Eirgrid & SONI, 2014)

As outlined in the literature review, it is possible that this price difference may
shrink over the coming years.
The introduction of the Carbon Price Floor in Britain in 2013 is leading to
increasing generation costs for fossil fuel power plants in BETTA. The closure
of old plant and plant not compliant with emissions directions in the coming
years may compound this. Deane et al. (2014) argue that the wholesale price
in Great Britain is in fact too low to cover long run generating costs making it
an unsustainable long-term model.
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3.4 Trading Across the Interconnector
3.4.1

Why and How to Trade Across the Interconnector

In order to become an interconnector user, candidates must complete the
User Agreement Form and Interconnector Administration Deed for the
relevant interconnector.
Additionally, they must register to trade in the SEM and BETTA and register
with the Auction Management Platform (AMP) as well as registering for an
Energy Identification Code which allows users trade within the different
European energy markets.
A list of all currently registered Interconnector Units is included in Appendix A.
Broadly speaking, the EWIC and Moyle Interconnectors are used by
participants in two ways.
3.4.1.1 Hedging using Explicit Auctions
Firstly, and most commonly, the interconnectors are used by participants to
provide hedging opportunities for their existing portfolio positions in the SEM
and BETTA market.
In

order

to

purchase

and

flow

energy

across

the

EWIC

or

Moyle

interconnector, an IU must first purchase the right to flow that energy across
the interconnector, this means buying capacity. Explicit Capacity auctions are
held on the Auction Management Platform. The AMP is a computerised system
that provides the necessary mechanism and outputs to facilitate trading
across the interconnectors. Here market participants can purchase the right to
utilise capacity on the interconnector from one day up to one year ahead of
the delivery day.
For example, an IU may purchase a seasonal product for a specified quantity
of MW for October – March of the following year. This gives the IU the right to
flow the agreed amount of electricity across the interconnector for that period
of time.
Once capacity has been secured, the user can then enter a contract to
purchase or sell an agreed quantity of energy from the other market (either
directly with another participant or via an anonymous platform in GB such as
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Trayport) at a fixed price for a period in the future; thus reducing their
exposure to future price fluctuations in the wholesale market.
The ‘Capacity Products’ available via explicit auction are illustrated in Figure
3.6.

Figure 3.6 Explicit Auctions, Source (EirGrid, 2014)

These ‘capacity products’ are auctioned throughout the year at predetermined
dates. The tranches of capacity auctioned differ for each trading product and
direction. A marginal pricing methodology is applied and all successful
applicants pay the auction clearing price for capacity.
The screenshot below illustrates what fictional auction participant ‘X_Trade’
would see following evaluation of an auction to flow energy across Moyle from
Northern Ireland to GB from 6am on the 1st of September 2011 to 6am on the
1st of October 2011. There were two participants in this auction and X_Trade
made three of the four bids submitted; one for 40 MW at 1.20 GBP/ MWh, one
for 50 MW at £1.10 /MWh, and one for 10 MW at £1.00 /MWh. The auction
price was evaluated by the AMP system to be 1.10 GBP/ MWh and so the first
bid was accepted, the second partially accepted and the third rejected.
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Figure 3.7 Long-term Auction Bids –After Evaluation Auction, Source (UNICORN
Systems, 2010)

Figure 3.7 taken from the common FUI portal illustrates the overall results
from an auction for ‘EWIC Monthly Import’ Capacity. The total allocated
capacity for this auction was 50 MW. Seven participants bid a collective
capacity of 342 MW; the price curve illustrates the spread of price quantity
bids. The marginal price to meet the total allocated capacity of 50 MW was
€8.13. The three successful applicants who had bid at or above this price paid
the auction clearing price and secured the capacity.

Figure 3.8 Auction Results Source (FUI, 2014)
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3.4.1.2 Proprietary Trading and Implicit Auctions
Capacity may also be purchased via Implicit Auctions. Implicit auctions allow
market participants to purchase capacity and the associated energy on Moyle
or the EWIC in one transaction for individual 30 minute interval periods of the
trade day.
These auctions are run by SEMO as part of the inter-day market runs (Ex Ante
2 and Within-Day 1). Market participants submit price-quantity pairs directly
to the SEM system. Unlike explicit auctions which are used for hedging
purposes, trading at the EA2 and WD1 stage is done to capture real time price
differences. This is referred to as ‘proprietary trading’ and is still relatively
uncommon across the East West or Moyle Interconnector.

Figure 3.9 Implicit Auctions, Source: (EirGrid, 2014)

The EA1 run is not an auction for interconnector capacity. Market participants
must however submit bid prices per trade interval to secure the energy
corresponding to their explicit EWIC capacity holdings.
Any residual capacity on the EWIC after the SEM Ex-Ante 1 run is made
available to market participants in the subsequent EA2 intraday auction. This
auction covers the full SEM trade day (06:00 – 06:00) (EirGrid, 2014).
Any residual capacity on the EWIC after the SEM EA2 run is made available to
market participants in the subsequent WD1 intraday auction. This auction
covers a twelve hour period within the SEM trade day from 18:00 – 06:00
(EirGrid, 2014).
Given that the final SMP is not known until four days after trading day,
participants engaging in this type of trading must have an understanding of
how SMP is derived and an ability to estimate future spikes and troughs.
There is less uncertainty around the wholesale price of electricity in GB.
40

An example of a company’s trading for one day (6:00 to 01:00 only shown
due to space constraints) across multiple gate windows is illustrated in figure
3.10.
As shown, the Company had secured 100 MW of import capacity via explicit
auction. Typically, once this capacity has been secured, the company will
purchase the associated energy from an anonymous GB power exchange for
the periods when they wish to use their capacity. This company used their full
100 MW import capacity for every half hour period shown. The company will
typically deliver this energy to a supply company in Ireland with whom they
have a Contract for Difference.
When the opportunity arose to purchase further capacity for certain half hour
periods at the EA2 gate window, the company entered bids and secured 40
MW import capacity and 120 MW export capacity. We can assume this was
because the capacity was available cheaply and that the export capacity was
purchased because it was expected that SMP might be lower than the GB
wholesale price at night. The 120 MW export capacity was used (by
purchasing the allocated quantities of energy for the relevant time periods)
from midnight on.
Finally, at the WD1 auction, a further 55 MW was imported between 11:30
and 15:00, 70 MW between 18:30 and 21:00 and 50 MW was exported
between midnight and 5am.
The resulting combined metered generation is illustrated in the graph which
shows net imports from 6:00 to 00:00 and net exports from midnight.
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Figure 3.10 Illustration of a theoretical company's trading for one day (06:00 to
01:00 only shown due to space constraints)
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3.4.2

The Rules

EWIC is owned and managed by EirGrid Interconnector Ltd. (EIL) and Moyle
by Moyle Interconnector Ltd. (MIL), part of Mutual Energy. The Interconnector
Owners are required to prepare relevant access arrangements in respect of
the interconnectors. The access arrangements are the agreed rules that need
to be adhered to when auctioning and using capacity on the interconnectors.
The published access arrangements detail the following information;
1. The procedures for auctioning rights to use interconnector capacity
2. The terms on which users may participant in auctions and
3. The terms for use of interconnector capacity.
In accordance with EU legislation the full transmission capacity of the
interconnectors is made available to market participants so that energy can
be imported or exported as market prices dictate, for the benefit of customers
in AI and Great Britain (EirGrid, 2014).
3.4.3

MO and IA Responsibilities

The Available Transfer Capacity of an Interconnector is determined by the IA
and is notified to the Market Operator by 10:00 two days before the trading
day (TD-2).
The IA must then submit the Active Interconnector Unit Capacity Holding Data
for each Interconnector Unit prior to the EA1 Gate Window Closure that is
consistent with the Interconnector Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) in each
direction.
Following the completion of each EA1, EA2 and WD1 MSP Software Run the
Market Operator shall:


Determine Interconnector Unit Nominations for each Interconnector
Unit and for each Interconnector based on the relevant inputs
(including Commercial Offer Data, Interconnector Technical Data and,
in the case of the EA1 MSP Software Run only, the Active
Interconnector Unit Capacity Holding).



Calculate the Modified Interconnector Unit Nominations (MIUNs),
separately for each Interconnector in accordance with the relevant
rules.
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Submit Aggregate Modified Interconnector Unit Nomination (AMIUNs)
to the relevant System Operator. AMIUNs represent aggregate import
and export MW values per Trading Period over each Interconnector
registered (CER & NI Utility Regulator, 2014).

3.4.4

System Operator Trading

Once the

market

has

closed the

SOs may

initiate changes

to the

interconnector schedules via SO counter trading for reasons of system
security or to facilitate priority dispatch generation (as directed in SEM
Committee Decision paper SEM-11-062).
The ability to counter trade is carried out in accordance with commercial
parameters approved by the Regulatory Authorities (RAs); any relevant
system limitations; and the availability of a counter party to give effect to any
potential trade (EirGrid, 2014).
In the past counter-trading on Moyle has been successfully used to alleviate
curtailment of priority dispatch generation. EirGrid is already engaged in
System Operator to System Operator (SO-SO) trading on EWIC with National
Grid UK to alleviate curtailment (EirGrid, 2014).
In addition to this, EirGrid is pursuing options which will allow a greater level
of SO counter trading.
Discussions with National Grid UK and the RAs have taken place. Three
potential enhanced SO counter trading models are being explored at present:
1. EirGrid and SONI trading directly on a UK Power Exchange;
2. An agent trading on EirGrid and SONI’s behalf;
3. EirGrid and SONI trading bilaterally with market participants (EirGrid,
2014).
3.4.5
The

Interconnector Administrator Trading
interconnector

administrator

can

also

engage

in

trades

on

the

interconnector for balancing purposes. This constitutes a very small portion of
total flows across the interconnector as outlined in Figure 6.18 in Chapter 6.
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4 I-SEM and the Internal Energy Market;
Implications for Interconnection
4.1 Regulatory Framework
A group of directives and regulations known as the Third Energy Package
together with associated Framework Guidelines and Network Codes form the
cornerstone of the Internal Energy Market, which Ireland and Northern
Ireland have committed to achieving by 2016 (EirGrid & SONI, 2014).
Interconnection provides the physical infrastructure necessary for this Internal
Energy Market to function.
A parallel and complementary development, Regional Electricity Markets
(REM), part of the Electricity Regional Initiative (ERI) has created several
regional electricity markets as an interim step to creating the single market.
Ireland belongs to the France-UK-Ireland (FUI) regional electricity market.
4.2 An EU Target for Installed Interconnector Capacity
The

European

Council

have

long

held

the

view

that

low

levels

of

interconnection have the effect of fragmenting the European Electricity
market and are an obstacle to both the development of competition and
uptake of renewable energy. In March 2002 The European Council agreed on
a level of interconnection between Member States of 10% of installed
production capacity by 2005. “Eight long years later even this meagre goal
remains elusive” said former European Green Party spokesperson Butikofer in
2010.
Determined to accelerate progress, the European Commission adopted a list
of 248 key energy infrastructure projects in October 2013. These projects
have been selected by twelve regional groups established by the new
guidelines for Trans-European Energy Network (TEN-E) (EirGrid Group, 2013).
In March of this year the Council called for ‘speedy implementation of
measures to meet the target of achieving interconnection of at least 10% of
installed electricity production capacity for all member states’ (European
Council, 2014) and invited the Commission to propose specific interconnection
objectives to be attained until 2030. The integrated climate and policy
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framework to 2030, due to be agreed upon in October 2014, is set to include
defined targets for installed interconnection capacity.
4.3 SEM Progress towards the Target Model
While targets for installed interconnector capacity are currently non-binding,
the European targets associated with market structure and trading are
required by law. These changes are designed to harmonise cross border
trading arrangements across all European electricity markets.
The associated new rules will be binding on all EU borders by 2014 and the
current SEM is not compliant with these rules.
Because of the significant changes required to the SEM a two year derogation
period has been granted to Ireland and Northern Ireland. The new Integrated
Single Electricity Market (I-SEM) for the all island electricity market must
therefore be compliant with the EU Target Model by the end of 2016 (SEM
Committee, 2014).
Aspects of the Internal Energy Market requirements, such as firm day-ahead
price coupling and continuous inter-day trading, will have significant impacts
on the Single Electricity Market (SEM) arrangements but should, in theory,
make it easier to trade across the interconnectors.
The target model does not explicitly prescribe how the national market is to
comply with the legislation and so a range of possible new market designs
were compiled by a SEM Committee comprising members of the regulatory
authorities in Ireland and Northern Ireland plus two independent experts. The
Northern Ireland Department of Trade and Industry and the Irish Department
of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources provide policy guidance to
this SEM Committee.
At a minimum, changes to the high level market design of SEM must provide
for the following five pillars by 2016 (as set out in the ACER Framework
Guidelines for Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management and the ACER
Framework Guidelines on Electricity Balancing):


Capacity Calculation and zones delimitation including a review of the
bidding zones in the SEM and potential interactions with locational
signals
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Cross Border Forward Hedging and Harmonisation of allocation rules
Day Ahead Market Coupling
Intra Day Continuous Trading
Cross Border Balancing

In 2012, the SEM Committee first published four new market design options
for the SEM which represent different ways of implementing the EU Target
Model.
The SEM Committee presented these options in their latest form in February
of this year in a Consultation Paper entitled ‘Integrated Single Electricity
Market; High Level Design for Ireland and Northern Ireland from 2016’. The
paper refers to the new wholesale market as the Integrated Single Electricity
Market (I-SEM); a title designed to ‘recognise the continuity of the existing
market while acknowledging the purpose of the new market to integrate more
fully with European market arrangements’ (SEM Committee, 2014).
The four options presented are
1.
2.
3.
4.

The
The
The
The

Adapted Decentralised Market
Mandatory ex-post Pool for Net Volumes
Mandatory Centralised Market and
Gross Pool –Net Settlement Market

These options combine different approaches to the following market aspects:







Participation in European markets for trading of energy in Day ahead
and Intra-day timescales
- Choices pertaining to this aspect of the market design will
involve decisions around portfolio vs. unit bidding, Mandatory vs.
voluntary and bid format at Day ahead and Intra-day timescales.
Process for reaching feasible dispatch position
- Here decisions must be made regarding the starting point of
dispatch, bids to the TSO for balancing and dispatch and the
timing of bid submissions
Imbalance/ Pool settlement
Arrangements for long-term trading; both internal and cross-border

How the four proposed options for I-SEM address each of the above market
components is outlined in Appendix B.
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At present, Option 3 appears to be the favoured solution. Option 3, ‘The
Mandatory Centralised Market’ emphasises the importance of the Day Ahead
Market as the main market for physical trading of energy between market
participants. The Intra-Day Market is then the exclusive route for making
adjustments. This should, according to the SEM Committee, ensure a high
level of trading in these specific markets. Bidding is based on individual
generators submissions, which is intended to enhance transparency in the
markets. The arrangements for balancing electricity generation and demand
involve relatively simple bids for increases and decreases in output (SEM
Committee, 2014).

4.4 Key Implications of market changes for Interconnection
The move to I-SEM should impact trade across the interconnector –given that
the ultimate goal of the European Target Model is to facilitate more efficient
trade. Two of the key areas where changes have been proposed are described
below. A detailed description of the proposed options is available from the
SEM Committee’s I-SEM High Level Design for Ireland and Northern Ireland
from 2014 Consultation Paper, available from the All Island Project website.
4.4.1

Market Coupling

Market coupling is a mechanism by which order books from different Power
Exchanges and capacity information from corresponding TSOs are centralized
and exploited to determine traded volumes, flows and prices (N-Side, 2012).
In simpler terms, it is .an algorithm which takes bids and offers from two (or
more) markets at day ahead stage, works out prices for both and schedules
interconnector flows to minimise overall cost’ (McGuckin, 2014).
4.4.1.1 Price Coupling of Regions
The European Target Model requires optimisation of area and cross-border
trades based on implicit auctions. This will be facilitated through Price
Coupling of Regions (PCR)
The North-Western Europe (NWE) Price Coupling of Regions initiative (PCR) is
an initiative taken by the Transmission System Operators and Power
Exchanges of the countries in North-Western Europe to develop a single price
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coupling solution to be used to calculate electricity prices across Europe and
allocate cross border capacity on a day-ahead basis (Nord Pool, 2014).
EUPHEMIA is the PCR algorithm that solves optimally the market coupling
problem by maximising consumer and supplier surplus and any congestion
rent arising from congested cross border links (EirGrid, SONI, SEMO).
The PCR solution went live on February 4th 2014 and the regions currently
involved are illustrated in Figure 4.1. As is clear from figure 4.1, the ultimate
goal is a pan-European Price Coupling of Day Ahead power market. EirGrid
and SEMO are ‘associated members’ of the PCR which allows them access to
the necessary information to keep abreast of developments in the PCR
initiative.
The algorithm is quite different from the SEM MSP Software in that it
optimises the purchase and sale of energy products (orders) as opposed to
optimising the schedule of generation. As such, part of the new I-SEM design
will involve implementing bid types that are ‘Euphemia-compliant’.

Figure 4.1 Map of Markets included in and associated with the Price Coupling of
Regions Initiative

One aspect of this will be to increase the number of gate windows. As outlined
in Chapter three, at present there are only two gate windows for implicit
capacity allocation (EA2 and WD1). Under I-SEM, this may go to 24 hourly
windows or 48 if half hour trading is selected.
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4.4.2

Types of Transmission Rights

It has yet to be decided whether physical or financial transmission rights will
be implemented under I-SEM.
Physical Transmission Rights (PTRs) represent the current situation. They
allow market participants to directly hedge the price and volume risk
associated with forward cross-border energy trades. However, PTRs can
reduce the amount of physical cross-zonal capacity available for implicit
allocation in the day-ahead market which may reduce the effective liquidity of
the day-ahead market (SEM Committee, 2014).
A Financial Transmission Right (FTR) does not give the holder a right to
physically nominate a flow at the day-ahead stage. Instead they receive the
price differential between the two zones for which they hold cross-zonal
capacity. FTRs can either be options (in which case the payment to the FTR
holder is never less than zero) or they can be obligations (whereby the FTR
holder has to make a payment if the price differential is in the opposite
direction to their capacity holding) (SEM Committee, 2014).
FTRs allow market participants to directly hedge the price risk associated with
forward cross-border energy trades, without reducing the amount of physical
capacity available to be used in market coupling. However, they rely on liquid
day ahead markets being in place in order to allow the FTR holder to manage
its volume risk (i.e. whether or not it will get scheduled) (SEM Committee,
2014).
The type of cross border transmission products (FTRs or PTRs) thus depends
largely on the liquidity (and hence the compulsory nature) of the day ahead
market (SEM Committee, 2014).
However, as yet no decision has been taken in relation to the proposed future
design of the I-SEM and severe criticism has been made of the favoured
approach of the SEM Committee by industry and others in responses to its
recent consultation on the proposed High Level Design. Industry responses to
the consultation can be found at the following address;
http://www.allislandproject.org/en/wholesale_overview.aspx?article=79e244a
0-4c06-4729-bd20-92873869df82
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5 Methodology
The methodology designed to meet the aims and objectives of this thesis
(listed in section 1.3.1) is described in this chapter which is divided into two
sections.
Part one outlines the methodology employed for quantitative data analysis.
Here data sets and their sources are listed; data collation is explained;
analytical tools are described and finally the specific steps taken in the
analysis itself are outlined.
Part 2 describes the qualitative component of the study which included an
extensive review of published literature; including EU, CER, Utility Regulator,
SEM and Ofgem regulations and guidelines, official consultation documents
and responses. Stakeholder interviews are also covered in this section.
Both sections begin with a general overview of data sources and analysis
techniques used. The approach then taken to answer specific research
questions follows. A summary of the specific methodology used to meet each
aim and objective is tabulated and presented in Appendix C.
5.1 Part I. Data Analysis
5.1.1

Obtaining the Data

Data for this analysis was primarily acquired from four sources; the dynamic
report section of the SEMO website, the apx group website and EirGrid and
SONI’s Wind Generation data centres.
5.1.1.1 Source 1, SEMO Dynamic and Static Reports
Once registered with the SEMO website, dynamic and static reports covering
multiple stages and elements of the market process can be downloaded.
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Figure 5.1 Screen shot showing process of selecting data from SEMO's dynamic report
database

The following reports were utilised in this analysis. Where the option of
selecting a run type was available, Run Type EP2 was selected unless
otherwise specified. Run Type EP2 occurs four days after the trading date.
5.1.1.1.1 Registered Units
A list of Registered Generator Units as of 28/05/2014 was downloaded from
the ‘Joining the Market’ section of the SEMO website. This list contains details
of the Associated account (ID and Name combined), TS_ID, Unit ID, Unit
Name, Unit Type, Registration Status and Final Effective Date.

Figure 5.2 Location of registered units on SEMO website
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Data from SEMO’s Registered Capacity Report was also utilised. This report
lists generator units and includes details registered capacity of that unit, the
resource type, fuel type and jurisdiction, and the account with which that
generating unit is associated with.
In the Registered List of Generator Units, Interconnector Unit IDs are
presented in the following format; Participant ID_I_Resource Name_Gate
Window. For example,
PT_500032_I_NIMOYLE_EA
Where PT_500032 represents the Interconnector Participant Viridian Energy
Supply Ltd (determined from the Registered Capacity Report), ‘I’ indicates
this is a registered Interconnector Unit, NIMOYLE indicates that this unit is
used for trading across the Moyle Interconnector and EA indicates it is used
for trading at the EA Gate Window (for an explanation of Gate Windows see
Chapter 3) .

5.1.1.1.2 Interconnector Flows
Flows of electricity across the interconnector are available from the SEMO
database in a number of formats. The following two datasets were primarily
employed:
Interconnector Flow
Interconnector

Flow

data

presents

Metered

Generator data

for

the

interconnector characterised by Unit ID (which, as outlined above includes
information on the participant, on which interconnector the trade took place
across and on the Gate Window associated with this trade), Meter Type, Run
Type, Trade Date and Delivery Date, hour and interval.
Interconnector Administrator and Transmission System Operator Flows are
included here. Given that this dataset presents Metered Generation, Run Type
is always EP2.
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Modified Interconnector Unit Nominations
MIUN data is presented in MW and categorised by participant name, resource
name, run type, trade date, delivery date, delivery hour and delivery interval
when downloaded from the SEMO website.
The Market Schedule Quantity for each Interconnector Unit in the EA1
software

run

is

fixed

into

an

Initial

Interconnector

Unit

Nomination

representing the quantity nominated for import or export for each IC unit.
These IUNs are subsequently adjusted to take into account factors such as IC
Dead bands between minimum import and minimum export to produce the
Modified Interconnector Unit Nomination (MIUN) for each IC unit in each
Trading Period (CER, 2013).
Any further capacity on the Interconnector can then be allocated based upon
the offers from IUs for the EA2 Gate (performed 13:00 D-1), such allocation is
again fixed into MIUNs for those Units.
The remaining capacity (if any) can be allocated to Interconnector Units which
make Offers for the WD1 Gate (09:30 D trading window is second half of day
(after 18:00) only) (CER, 2013).
Thus if an interconnector has imported and/ or exported flows across the
interconnector using multiple gate windows (as illustrated in figure X –
Chapter 3) these will be represented in the Market Schedule Quantity as
separate MIUNs.
MIUN data does not contain information on Interconnector Administrator or
Transmission System Operator Flows. In summary, they represent the final
quantity of electricity all commercial interconnector users pay or are paid for.
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Figure 5.3 Screenshot of Modified Interconnector Unit Nomination Dynamic Report,
SEMO website

5.1.1.1.3 Shadow Price and SMP
SMP represents the energy component of the total cost of producing
electricity. As outlined in Chapter 3, the final SMP, paid to generators and by
suppliers, is calculated by the EP2 software run. Data is classified by Trade
Date, Run Type, Currency, Delivery Date, Delivery Time (in the form hh:mm,
GMT), SMP and Shadow Price. Shadow price data was not utilised in this
analysis.

5.1.1.2 Source 2, GB Power Exchange Data
Given the differences in market structure between the GB and AI systems
(described in Chapter 3) there is no single figure comparable with AI SMP in
the GB market.
However, power exchanges, which constitute a small portion of trading in GB
represent an indication of wholesale price according to the BSC Administrator,
Elexon (Elexon, 2013). Reference price data from the apx Power exchange
has been employed here. The methodology used to establish the Reference
Price Data (RPD) indices for the APX Power UK Spot market is available on the
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apx group website. The units used are GBP and the data is presented in a
date-time interval matrix for each year.

Figure 5.4 Screenshot of the location from which apx RPD data was obtained from the
apx Power Exchange website

Historical daily exchange rate data from the SEMO website was used to
convert these values from GBP to Euro. A Vlookup was used in excel to match
the correct exchange rates with the relevant data entries.

5.1.1.3 Source 3, EirGrid and SONI Wind Data
Wind Generation and Wind Forecast in MW can be downloaded from Eirgrid
and SONI’s websites for the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland
respectively across a specific period of time in fifteen minute intervals.
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Figure 5.5 Screenshot of the location from which wind forecast and
generation data was obtained from the apx EirGrid website

5.1.2

Collating Data Sources

In order to analyse the data listed above, it had to first be collated –this was
primarily done by time interval or Unit ID.
While all SEMO and APX data employed was given in half hour intervals, these
time intervals were presented in different formats for different data sets.
For example, SEMO sometimes present time intervals in two columns, one for
date in the form dd/mm/yyyy and one for time in the form hh:mm.
Other times, SEMO presented time intervals in the form of delivery date,
delivery hour, and delivery interval; with delivery hour being represented by
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an integer from 1 to 24 and delivery interval being either 1 or 2 to represent
respectively the first and second half hour period.
Where this format is used, sometimes delivery hour 1, delivery interval 1
represents the period from 01:00 hours to 01:30 GMT.
Other times, (1,1) represented the period from 07:00 – 07:30 GMT , the first
half hour of the SEMO trading day which runs from 7am to 7am.
There are also instances where delivery hour 1, interval 1 refers to the time
period from 00:00 to 00:30.
As the protocol being used for each set of SEMO data is not clarified, the
datasets had to be graphed and a knowledge of daily patterns used to
determine which protocol was being used.
Collating data according to Time Interval
In order to combine and compare different variables, a uniform means of
expressing date and time in one column had to be determined.
This was achieved by calculating date in dd/mm/yyyy format and time in
hh/mm format, and combining them to produce a unique decimal number
representing that date and time.
This requires a knowledge of how excel represents dates and times.
Excel represents all dates relative to 01/01/1990. So 01/01/1990 equals 1
when converted to ‘general’ format. 01/01/2014 converts to 41,640 –the
number of days since 01/01/1990.
Time in hh/mm format will convert to number of minutes since 00:00 when
converted to general format. So 08:30 will produce 510 when converted to
general form.
With this knowledge, date and time, regardless of how they were presented in
any number of columns could be converted to a single cell entry in the form
‘dd/mm/yyyy hh:mm’ allowing different data sets to be combined.
Table 5.1 illustrates how this method is used to convert delivery date, hour
and interval to a single ‘Time Code’.
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First, time interval is converted to minutes using an ‘if’ statement (if
delivery hour is equal to 1 return 0, if it is equal to 2 return 30). The
time in minutes is calculated by multiplying the delivery hour by 60 and
adding column 4, to produce column 5



To represent this in time format in excel, this figure must be divided by
1440 (the number of minutes in one day) and the format converted to
‘time’. See column 6.



Delivery date and time in hh:mm format are added in column 7.



Column 8 represents the values in column 7 in ‘general’ format.

For the case of apx data where time was expressed as hh:mm – hh:mm, the
data had to be first split into separate columns and the second time removed
before time could be converted to minutes.
When this figure had been calculated for each time period for each set of
data, a Vlookup was used to combine the three sets accurately.
Table 5.1 Example of how uniform 'Time Code' was calculated to combine data sets

Column 1

Delivery
Date

Column
2

Column
3

Column
4

Column
5

Column
6

Delivery Delivery
Hour
Interval

Delivery
Interval
represe
nted in
minutes

Real
time
in
minut
es

Minutes /
1400 to
convert
to excel
time
format

31/05/2014

7

1

0

420

07:00:00

31/05/2014

7

2

30

450

07:30:00

31/05/2014

8

1

0

480

08:00:00

31/05/2014

8

2

30

510

08:30:00

Column 7

Delivery
Date plus
'real time'
combined
31/05/2014
07:00
31/05/2014
07:30
31/05/2014
08:00
31/05/2014
08:30

Column 8

Time Code –
Delivery date
and time as a
decimal
41790.291666
6667
41790.3125
41790.333333
3333
41790.354166
6667

Collating Data according to Participant ID, Unit ID or Account Name
By separating data into columns and using a series of Vlookups, the
Registered Generator Unit dataset and the data from SEMO’s Registered
Capacity report were combined to create a comprehensive dataset on
registered participants and their associated units.
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This could then be used in combination with the vlookup function to enrich
datasets that included minimal information on the interconnector user
associated with the entry.
5.1.3

Data Analysis

Once datasets had been collated as described above, Excel ‘Pivot Tables’ were
employed to add, compare and graph variables. Figure 5.6 illustrates a
section of a pivot table. Figure 5.7 illustrates how data from that table is
converted to a pivot chart. Each column from the pivot table is represented in
the menu to the right of the pivot chart and variables can be added, removed
and manipulated.

Figure 5.6 Screenshot of a Pivot Table

Figure 5.7 Screenshot of a Pivot Chart being created from the data in the Pivot Table
in Figure 5.4
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5.1.4

Compiling and comparing Interconnector Flows and influencing factors;
Methodology

This section of the analysis required the collation of a number of data sets.
Given the volume of data involved and the time constraints, it was decided
that just one month would be analysed. June 2014 was selected as, at the
time, this was the most recently available data and would produce the most
up to date results.
Firstly, to represent the correlation between interconnector flows and other
factors; Interconnector Flow, All Island System Load, Wind Generation, APX
RPD and SMP data were graphed for one month. These data sets were
correlated by time using the method described in section 5.1.2.
The results could then be graphed using a pivot table, as described in section
5.1.2 and compared. The pivot table allowed different variables to be added
or removed to identify their relative weighting and facilitate closer inspection.
Moyle and EWIC were found to display similar characteristics and so were
graphed as a single line for clarity of visual inspection.
Next, in order to understand better how the interconnector is being used,
MIUN data for one full year (June 2013 – June 2014) was compiled and
cumulative flows for each gate window in both the SEM to BETTA and BETTA
to SEM direction were calculated. The results were presented in tabular, pie
chart and bar chart form to illustrate clearly the overall distribution and trends
emerging over time.
The results were then presented for just one representative week so that daily
trading patterns could be identified.
Next, each MIUN value was matched with its associated Interconnector User.
This was achieved by comparing Unit ID columns in the MIUN data set with
those in the Registered Units dataset and employing a Vlookup.
Using the filtering feature available in excel Pivot Tables, the Modified
Interconnector Unit Nomination (MIUN) data for each Interconnector User
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over the full year could be presented separately allowing trading patterns to
be identified.
5.1.5

Approximating the Welfare Benefits of the Interconnector; Methodology

In order to illustrate the welfare benefits of the interconnector to Irish
consumers, a simplified analysis comparing the estimated cost of net energy
imports for June 2014 with the theoretical amount it would have cost us to
produce this energy at home were the interconnectors not available.
First net commercial imports had to be derived from MIUN Data which is
available from SEMO’s dynamic report database. MIUN was used because it
excludes IA and TSO trades which allows us to examine just commercial
trades and ignore balancing and counter trading.
MIUN MW data is categorised by participant name, resource name, run type,
trade date, delivery date, and delivery hour and delivery interval when
downloaded from the SEMO website. As such, the data had to be sorted and
all participant trades totalled for each time period. Different numbers of IUs
participated in the various trading intervals so two sorting columns were
created to gather and total entries associated with each time period using ‘if’
statements in excel.
SMP data was also downloaded from the SEMO Dynamic Reports database.
As previously discussed, Power Exchange data from the UK can be used an
approximate for GB wholesale price. ‘APX Power UK RPD historical data’ was
downloaded from the APX Group website for the month of June.
The three data sets were collated by ‘Time Code’ as described in section 5.2.
As SMP and APX RPD data are given in €/MW and £/ MW, MIUN values were
not converted to MWh. This is allowable because the same time periods are
used across all data sets, but it means we must examine proportional
differences rather than actual values.
Net imports could then be multiplied by the approximated value for GB
wholesale electricity price for each time period. The cumulative total of these
values is an estimate of the cost of net imports for that month.
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Net imports were then multiplied by SMP values to represent what the cost of
producing this electricity at home would have been. It should be noted that
this represents an estimation, not an actual figure, as we would expect SMP
for these periods to have been higher were the interconnector not in place.
Additionally, the SMP does not include capacity or constraint payments.
5.1.6

Are the Interconnectors helping us to achieve our Renewable Targets;
Methodology

This section of the data analysis was again limited to one month; June 2014.
Unlike previous sections that exclusively looked at commercial flows, this
section

of

the

report

included

Transmission

System

Operator

and

Interconnector Administrator Flows in an attempt to quantify the impact of
EirGrid Counter Trading on the facilitation of wind.
Firstly cumulative flows for the month were compared to determine the
overall volume and net direction of TSO trades. Next, TSO counter flows were
graphed against actual and forecast wind data obtained from EirGrid and
SONI as described above.

5.2 Part II: Qualitative Analysis; Literary Review and Interviews

5.3 Literature Review
In addition to the published reports and analyses reviewed as part of Chapter
2, a wide range of EU, Ofgem, SEM, CER and Utility Regulator and Eirgrid
published regulations, consultation documents and associated responses, final
decision papers and conference proceedings were reviewed and critically
analysed.
5.4 Semi Structured Interviews
Semi Structured interviews, as defined by Robson (Robson, 2002) refer to
interviews which have predetermined questions, but the order can be
modified based upon the interviewer’s perception of what seems most
appropriate. Question wording can be changed and explanations given;
particular questions which seem inappropriate with a particular interviewee
can be omitted, or additional ones included.
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Once an initial appreciation of the processes involved in interconnection and
the key issues had been determined, semi-structured interviews were
completed with energy traders based in Ireland who participate in purchasing
and selling capacity and energy across the interconnector. In addition to
enquiries regarding specific points that required clarification on account of
contradictions within the literature, these interviews involved a number of
open ended questions which allowed the interviewees to highlight the most
important material that the interviewer may otherwise not have been aware
of.
The interviewees and the companies for whom they work have been kept
confidential for the sake of commercial sensitivity.
5.5 Critical Analysis of EirGrid Study; Methodology
A critical analysis of EirGrid’s 2014 study (Campbell, 2014) is undertaken in
Chapter 6. This was informed by the following sources;


EWIC Impact to SEM; Explanation of Analysis (Campbell, 2014)



Information Note on the East West Interconnector (EirGrid, 2014)



CER Decision CER/13/191 ‘Accessing Tariffs and Financing the Gas
Transmission System; Consultation Process (CER, 2013) and Decision
Paper (CER, 2013) and published industry responses to the new
regulation.



Solver Choice in the SEM: A Comparative Study of Lagrangian
Relaxation vs. Mixed Integer Programming (Eirgrid, SONI, 2010)



Interviews with market participants.
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6 Results and Discussion
6.1 Introduction
Delivery of the objectives listed in chapter 1, part 3 is reported in this chapter
which is divided as follows.
In section 6.2, the prevailing trends in direction and volume of interconnector
flows are presented. This sets the basis for section 6.3, which attempts to
ascertain how the interconnector is being used and what the motivating
factors for trading across the interconnector are. This study would assert that
an understanding of these factors is a vital prerequisite to determining the
best regulatory measures to optimise welfare.
In section 6.4 and 6.5, the performance of the interconnectors with respect to
reducing the price of electricity and facilitating renewable generation is
assessed.
A final conclusion on the results is presented in Chapter 7.
6.2 Interconnector Flows; Trends in Volumes and Direction
Based on the theory of Interconnection outlined in Chapter 1, and the body of
research presented in the literature review, one might expect to see a close
correlation

between

SEM-BETTA

wholesale

price

differences

and

Interconnector Flows.
The data sample presented in figure 6.1 would indicate otherwise. Figure 6.1
compares the combined net interconnector flows of Moyle and EWIC with
price differences between the SEM and BETTA (where AI prices are
represented by SMP and GB prices represented by APX RPD data) for one
week in June 2014, AI total system load and wind generation for one week
are also graphed. Price Differences have been scaled by 10 to allow more
accurate visual inspection –as we are examining proportional differences not
actual values this is acceptable.
This comparison indicates that for Interconnection between AI and GB the
correlations between price difference, wind and interconnector flows that one
would expect based on the theory are not reflected in the real data. Indeed,
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interconnector flows are almost exclusively from GB to AI in this sample
despite clear instances of lower wholesale prices in AI.
Interconnector flows are at their highest during the day when demand in
Ireland is greatest and while net flows drop to zero or below (ie. net exporting
is occurring) nightly in response to the predictable nightly drop in SMP, they
do not appear to respond in any substantial way to arbitrage opportunities or
instances of high volumes of wind on the SEM as they occur throughout the
day.
The following sections will examine why this is happening.

Net Interconnector Flows Vs All Island System Load, Wind Generation and AI-GB Price
Differences, 1st to 7th June 2014

Figure 6.1 All Island System Load, Wind Gen, IC Flows and Price Difference with UK
apx rpd. for June 1-7th 2014

As outlined in chapter 3 part 4, EA modified interconnector unit nominations
represent energy flows associated with capacity which has been bought at
long term ‘explicit’ auctions, be they annual auctions, seasonal, quarterly,
monthly or daily. EA2 and WD1 MIUNs on the other hand represent energy
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and capacity purchased at implicit auctions. The EA2 bidding window closes at
11:30 on the day prior to delivery and the auction covers the full SEM trading
day (06:00 – 06:00). The bidding window for the WD1 auction closes at 07:00
on the day of delivery and the auction covers a twelve hour period within the
SEM trade day (18:00 – 06:00).
Where these auctions fit into the SEMO timescale is summarised below.

Figure 6.2 Cycle per trading day graphic, Source (SEMO, 2013)

With this knowledge, we can interpret MIUN data available from the SEMO
database

to

gain

a

basic

understanding

of

the

type

of trades

the

interconnectors are predominantly being used for. Table 6.1 and Figure 6.3
present a breakdown of interconnector flows by flow direction and auction
type for the year long period from the 1st June 2013 to the 2nd of June 2014.
Figure 6.4 illustrates the breakdown by month.
Table 6.1 Figure 3 Breakdown of total AI GB Interconnector Flows by Direction and
Auction Type, June 2013 – End May 2014. Note these figures do not include TSO or IA
trades

Row Labels
I_NIMOYLE
I_ROIEWIC
Grand Total

Sum of EA + Sum of EA - Sum of WD1 + Sum of WD1 - Sum of EA2 + Sum of EA2 3061910.605 -171782.106
96251.822
-15472.639
64353.951 -271279.178
6637735.849 -379123.656
89963.371
-51290.243
52200.109 -357674.647
9699646.454 -550905.762
186215.193
-66762.882
116554.06 -628953.825
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Figure 6.3 Graphical representation of breakdown of total AI GB Interconnector Flows by
Direction and Auction Type, June 2013 – June 2014. Note these figures do not include
TSO or IA flows
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Flows from GB to AI (positive) and AI to GB (negative) for EA, EA2 and
WD1 Gate Windows June 2013 - End May 2014

Figure 6.4 Flows from GB to AI (positive) and AI to GB (negative) for EA, EA2 and
WD1 Gate Windows June 2013 - End May 2014

From this data we can ascertain that the bulk (89%) of flows across the
Interconnectors from June 2013 to the end of May 2014 were from GB to AI
and a staggering 97% of these imported flows were secured in advance via
explicit auction. It is not surprising then that Figure 6.1 shows little response
to short term price differentials – since the vast majority of energy flowing
across the interconnector was secured in advance, traders could not possibly
predict hour to hour to hour price differentials.
Exports include a higher percentage of implicit auctions; trades associated
with the EA2 gate window represent 51% and WD1 trades represent 5% of
exports during this period.
By examining flows again over a sample week long period, and this time
breaking them down into their constituent EA, EA2 and WD1 MIUNs, a clear
pattern can be identified.
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Commercial Trade across Moyle & EWIC Gate Window, One Week, 11th to 17th May
2014
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Figure 6.5 Trading across EWIC, breakdown by Gate Window for 11th to 17th May
2014

The EA flows from GB to AI demonstrate a distinct ‘blocky’ pattern which
reinforces the idea that the capacity and energy associated with these flows
has been purchased ‘in bulk’. As outlined in Chapter three, capacity is
purchased for a period of time and the associated energy is then bought for
intervals during that time (ie. there are times when the capacity which has
been purchased will not be used because it is uneconomic to do so) –here, EA
import capacity appears to be used during the day from approximately 09:00
to 23:00 but is used to a much lesser extent at night. In discussion with a
representative from a company which trades across the interconnector, it was
explained that this is because, on average, SMP falls closer to, and sometimes
below, the price of electricity in GB during these hours. Therefore it does not
make economic sense to import energy during these hours. Exports too
appear to be dominated by EA MIUNs for the week examined above; however
from figure 6.3 we can see that over the course of the year, EA2 MIUNs
accounted for 51% and EA for 44% of commercial trades.
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Wind [MW]

Modified Interconnector Unit Nominations [MW]

1000

In the next section of this report, we will break down these results further,
this time by Interconnector Participant. This will allow us to identify the
different trading strategies that make up net interconnector flows.
6.3 Trading Across the Interconnector; Three Strategies
Who is using the Interconnectors, how are they using them and why?
Details of all registered Interconnector Users who secured commercial
capacity on the Moyle and/ or East West Interconnectors from June 2013 to
End May2014 have been compiled from a SEMO list of registered generator
units and matched against MIUN data. These details are tabulated below with
their associated parent companies. Note Cenergise and Endesa are registered
on both Moyle and EWIC but only traded across EWIC for the duration of this
analysis.
Table 6.2 Details of active registered commercial Interconnector Users

Parent

Trading across MOYLE

Trading across the EWIC

Company
User ID
SSE Airtricity

User Name

PT_500

Airtricity Energy

021

Supply NI Ltd

User ID
PT_400021

User Name
Airtricity Ltd
(Generation)

Generation
ESB Group
Viridian Group
Bord Gáis
Éireann

PT_500

Coolkeeragh ESB

024

Ltd (Generation)

PT_500

Viridan Energy

031

Supply Ltd

PT_500

Bord Gais

037

PT_400030

ESB PGEN

PT_400100

Viridian Energy
Supply Limited

PT_400099

Bord Gais

PT_500070

Danske

Interconnector
(NI)

Danske

PT_500

Commodities

070

ElectroRoute

PT_500
069

RWE Group

PT_500
058

Danske
Commodities A/S
ElectroRoute

Commodities A/S
PT_400096

Energy Trading
RWE Supply and
Trading GmbH

ElectroRoute
Energy Trading

PT_400113

RWE Supply &
Trading GmbH
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Endesa Ireland
Ltd.

PT_500
071

Cenergise Ltd.

Endesa

PT_400114

Generación

PT_500

Endesa
Generación

Cenergise Limited

PT_400136

Cenergise Limited

075

Endesa Ireland
0%

RWE Group
19%

ElectroRoute
16%

Danske
Commodities
3%
Bord Gáis

Cenergise
0%

SSE Airtricity
22%

ESB Group
11%

Viridian Group
22%

7%
Figure 6.6 Breakdown of Total volumes commercially traded across Moyle & EWIC
combined by Interconnector User (June 2013 - End May 2014)

The following analysis shows that the companies listed here differ in their use
of the interconnector, not just in terms of volumes traded but in total trading
strategy. Using SEMO data, three distinct trading patterns have been
identified and will be explored in the following sections.

6.3.1

Hedging via the Interconnectors; ‘Bulk Buying’ Energy

The trading behaviour of Bord Gáis is typical of how most large companies in
Ireland have historically used the AI-GB interconnectors.
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Total energy traded across the interconnector by Bord Gáis for the period
from June 2013 to June 2014 is presented in Figure 6.7. The data illustrates
that Bord Gáis have almost exclusively purchased capacity at explicit auction.
In discussion with a representative from a large energy company, this
strategy was explained as follows; Supply Company X wishes to hedge their
portfolio and so they enter into a Contract for Difference with a registered
interconnector User. In AI, the suppliers and registered interconnector users
entering into this kind of arrangement are most commonly from the same
company or group –the company or group will generally also have a
generation portfolio.
The Interconnector User then submits bids via the Auction Management
Platform to secure long term import capacity to meet their contractual
obligation. If they are successful in the capacity auction, they then purchase
the associated energy either via a direct bilateral contract with a GB generator
or trader or, more commonly, via a GB Energy Exchange. Using their
knowledge of average AI-GB price differences though they will only purchase
energy during the day when it is on average more profitable and they will
forego their capacity at night.
In this way, the supply company secures a guaranteed volume of energy to
meet future demand at a fixed price that they expect will be on average lower
than SMP for that period of time. It is important to note that they are
interested in the average savings as opposed to taking advantage of price
differences as they arise. The Interconnector User must also receive their
share for conducting the trade.
This behaviour is considerably different to the ‘optimal’ trading that was used
to create the models to predict interconnector impact and justify its
construction as described in the literature review.

73

Total Bord Gáis MIUNs from June 2013 to End of May 2014
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Figure 6.7 Bord Gáis trade across the Moyle and East West Interconnectors from June
2013 to End of May 2014

Broadly speaking, RWE Supply and Trading GmbH traded in a similar manner
for the period studied –with the exception of the high volumes exported
nightly from the 2nd to the 8th of October.
Total RWE MIUNs, June 2013 to End of May 2014
300
200
100
0
-100
-200

Sum of EA
+
Sum of EA Sum of
WD1 +
Sum of
WD1 Sum of EA2
+
Sum of EA2
-

-300
-400
Figure 6.8 RWE trade across the Moyle and East West Interconnectors from June
2013 to End of May 2014
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6.3.2

Proprietary Traders –Capturing arbitrage opportunities

At other end of the spectrum we have the companies whose strategies are
characterised by arbitrage or proprietary trading, i.e. their trading strategies
are designed to take advantage of price discrepancies through the purchase
and sale of capacity and energy. These companies trade to profit from the
market.
Electroroute and Cenergise are two new companies based in Ireland who
appear to be utilising the interconnector in this manner. According to the data
collected here, these are currently the only two companies trading in this way.
As illustrated in figure 6.9 and 6.10, the trading behaviour of these companies
is markedly different to those described in section 6.3.1.
Electroroute was established in 2011 and as illustrated in Figure 6.6
accounted

for

16%

of

total

commercial

energy

traded

across

the

interconnector during the year long period studied. Cenergise commenced
operation less than a year ago and represented just 0.09% of energy traded
during the period studied. Cenergise exclusively traded across EWIC for the
period studied but are registered to trade on Moyle.
The financial success of these companies in their use of the interconnectors in
this manner is unknown due to the commercially sensitive nature of this
information. The rate of expansion of Electroroute as a company however
would tend to suggest the strategy is proving profitable.
The redistribution of ‘welfare gains’ (as described in section 1.1) from this
type of trading is also unknown. This thesis would propose that further study
comparing the distribution of welfare gains from this type of trading; with the
distribution of welfare gains modelled by early studies (particularly those
justifying EU support of interconnection infrastructure) would be merited.
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Figure 6.9 Cenergise trade across the Moyle and East West Interconnectors from June
2013 to End of May 2014
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Figure 6.10 Electroroute trade across the Moyle and East West Interconnectors from
June 2013 to End of May 2014

6.3.3

Optimising Trades; A growing trend

One of the most interesting trends to emerge from the data relates to a
development in the trading behaviour of companies who traditionally would
have taken a similar approach to Bord Gáis. This trend involves a growing
pattern of exporting at night to capture price differentials
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ESB and Airtricity, who together made up a third of energy traded across the
Interconnectors during the period studied, have been the pioneers of this
approach. As with Bord Gáis and RWE, ESB and Airtricity’s trading entities
enter contracts for difference with their associated supply companies and
purchase the energy to meet those contracts from GB, importing across the
interconnectors.
However, it appears that since November 2013, these two companies have
begun to explore opportunities for arbitrage trading at night when SMP drops;
at present, this is primarily taking the form of EA exports (purchasing from
the SEM pool to sell in GB) in addition to some WD1 and EA2 trades in both
directions.
Total ESB MIUNs, June 2013 to End of May 2014
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Figure 6.11 ESB Interconnector trade across
Interconnectors from June 2013 to End of May 2014
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Total Airtricity MIUNs, June 2013 to End of May 2014
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Figure 6.12 Airtricity trade across the Moyle and East West Interconnectors from
June 2013 to End of May 2014

Viridian Energy Supply Ltd. who traded a full 22% of the energy traded across
the interconnector during the period studied have also begun to engage with
EA exports at night, however on a much smaller scale than ESB and Airtricity.
Total Viridian MIUNs, June 2013 to End of May 2014
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Figure 6.13 Viridian Energy trade across the Moyle and East West Interconnectors
from June 2013 to End of May 2014

The significance of this change in behaviour of two key market participants is
illustrated in the following graph of EA AI to GB trades.
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EA Gate Window Flows from AI to GB June 2013 - end May 2014
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Figure 6.14 EA MIUNs from AI to GB June 2013.

6.3.4

Trading Trends Conclusion

The trends identified in the above sections demonstrates clearly that despite
the introduction of an intra-day trading window in 2011 (WD1), Energy
associated with explicit capacity constitutes the vast bulk of flows across the
Interconnector. This presents a new perspective on the concept of welfare
gains given that it is evidently not possible to optimally respond to short term
price differences using this approach, however, average price differences over
a long term period can be captured.
Given the relatively new phenomenon of arbitrage trading by Cenergise and
Electroroute, it is difficult to determine what the impact of this will be.
Whether or not these companies will help reduce the final price of electricity
for consumers (which will depend on the volumes traded and degree of rent
capture) they do seem to be impacting the trading behaviour of well
established companies who are now exploring a more dynamic approach to
trade across the interconnectors. Ultimately the degree of profitability will
determine the extent to which this trading approach will grow. The resistance
of Bord Gáis to adopt to this approach to date raises some questions, however
their response to the latest I-SEM Consultation paper which argues 'Only large
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portfolio players such as ESB Group are in a position to arbitrage portfolio
bids to the detriment of the competitiveness of smaller players.‘ would
suggest it is a matter of resources.
6.4 Is trade across the Interconnectors reducing the Price of
Electricity in Ireland?
This section contains two parts, in the first; a simplistic analysis of the impact
of Interconnection is undertaken using real data for the month of June 2014.
In the second part, a critical analysis of EirGrid’s more detailed analysis is
undertaken.
6.4.1

SMP Vs APX RPD; What does the Data Say?

In this section, an analysis is undertaken to compare an estimated value for
the cost of net energy imported during the month of June with a theoretical
value of what it would have cost to produce this energy in each market.
A comparison of SMP and RPD for the month of June is illustrated in Figure
6.15 and 6.16. The data is graphed once for the full month, and once from
the first to the 28th to remove the extreme peak and allow closer inspection.
The blue entry represents price difference (SMP – APX RPD). Positive values
indicate the SMP is higher than the APX price, values below the zero axis
indicate price in the GB is higher.

SMP Vs apx RPD, June 2014
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Figure 6.15 SMP Vs apx RPD, June 2014
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SMP Vs apx RPD, June 1st to 28th 2014
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Figure 6.16 SMP Vs apx RPD, June 1st to 28th 2014

Contrary to what was expected, the average reference price for GB at 58.97
€/MW was higher by 15% than SMP (at 51.21 €/MW) for this period.
Despite this, flows were predominantly in the GB -> AI direction.
MIUNs June 2014 (MIUNs do not include TSO or IA flows). Positive values
indicate flows from GB to Ireland.
1000
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-400
Figure 6.17 MIUNs June 2014 (MIUNs do not include TSO or IA flows). Positive values
indicate flows from GB to Ireland.

The following graph compares an estimated value for the cost of net energy
imported during this period with a theoretical value of what it would have cost
to produce the energy in country. The data is presented from the 1-28th as
the extreme peak on the 29th changes the scale and makes visual inspection
of the results more difficult.

81

Figure 6.18 Estimated cost of purchasing net MW imported in June 1st - 28th 2014 from
GB Vs Theoretical cost of producing this volume in country Where exports exceeded
imports values were put to zero therefore earnings from exports not represented

The results indicated the theoretical cost of purchasing net imports from GB
in June 2014 was, over the course of the month, 18% higher than the
estimated cost of producing in Ireland.
These results are contrary to what would be expected based on the theory
and literature review. What does this mean?
Firstly, there are a number of assumptions which influence the margin of error
that should be considered;
1. As previously discussed, APX RPD is only an approximation for GB
wholesale price. The actual prices secured by interconnector users
importing energy to Ireland are confidential.
2. Secondly, SMP does not include capacity or constraint payments.
3. SMP would of course be different if indigenous generators were bidding
into the SEM as opposed to the energy being imported across the
interconnector. The studies outlined in the Literature Review indicate it
would be higher without the interconnector.
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Despite these assumptions, these results are still interesting as they suggest
potential uneconomic use of the indicator which raises the possibility that
systemic barriers to efficient trade exist.
One factor to consider here is the extent to which capacity payments may
have changed these results. As discussed in Chapter 3, Interconnector users
importing into the SEM receive SMP and Capacity Payments based on flows.
Interconnector Users exporting out from SEM pay SMP and Capacity Payments
based on flows. If capacity payments were responsible for traders importing
to the SEM when the price in GB was lower, this would constitute an
inefficient use of the interconnector. The above results suggest that further
investigation into whether these payments are potentially encouraging import
flows where they are not economical would be merited.
A second factor to consider is the changing dynamics in prices between the
SEM and BETTA as discussed in the Literature review. The latest Regulatory
Regular SEM Price Report (SEM-13-070) covering the period May - August
2013 Inclusive indicated that UK prices remained lower, but noted that other
markets listed did not include all energy and capacity costs in the same
manner as the SEM and as a result, the comparison may not be completely
accurate.
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Figure 6.19 Wholesale price per MW paid to generators across Europe, Source (CER &
Utilit Regulator, 2013)

The results presented in this section would suggest that close attention should
be paid to any changes in the wholesale price differential between GB and
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Ireland in the next report, and into the future, particularly as reforms are
introduced to BETTA as part of the programme of Electricity Market Reform.
This thesis would hold that the low levels of flows from AI to GB, despite clear
arbitrage opportunities merits close attention.
In a 2009 response to a SEM Consultation Paper (Moyle Interconnector Ltd,
2009), Moyle Interconnector Limited found that one of the major problems
non SEM traders identified with the SEM (and barriers to them entering SEM)
was the lack of an ex ante price in the market. It was noted that they would
expect this to be provided through a healthy liquid market for CFD’s but this
did not exist.
In discussion with Irish market traders as part of the research process for this
thesis, the SEM SMP was described as being ‘notoriously difficult to predict’.
Given this level of uncertainty, users are not prepared to take the increased
risk of trading higher volumes. This was presented as a fundamental reason
why more arbitrage opportunities are not being captured.
6.4.2

Critical Analysis of EirGrid Published Results

As outlined in the literature review, in April 2014 EirGrid published the results
of an analysis of EWIC’s impact on overall production costs and SMP. The
study found that for the duration of their analysis (1st May 2013 – 30th April
2014) EWIC had had the effect of reducing the SMP by 9%. While conducting
a sufficiently detailed independent analysis with the same goal was beyond
the scope of this thesis, the methodology and assumptions of the EirGrid
study will be analysed here with a view to determining the possible margin of
error for their results.
The analysis was based on the comparison of a base case ‘EWIC ON’ scenario
representing EWIC being fully available from May 1st 2013 to April 1st 2014
with an ‘EWIC OFF’ scenario representing an unconnected AI market for the
same period. In order to model the Interconnector Off scenario, EirGrid
replaced the interconnector with an equivalent sized gas generator and
assumed the same bidding behaviour.
This study found that three of the assumptions upon which this analysis was
based do not reflect the current reality. Correcting these assumptions would
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have cumulatively had the effect of lowering resulting percentage impact of
the EWIC interconnector on SMP.
1. Assumptions surrounding Bidding Behaviour
EirGrid’s study assumed that market participants would adopt the same
bidding behaviour with and without the interconnector.
This assumption did not factor in the effect of a regulatory change to gas
transmission tariffs which came into effect in October 2013, as per the CER
Decision CER/13/191 of 21 August 2013.
These changes provided for the removal of secondary gas capacity transfers
at the exit and effectively meant that generators lost the flexibility to adjust
their capacity to match their usage on a daily basis.
This change was seen as a necessary response to under recovery of revenues
by Bord Gáis which was a result of the reduction in domestic demand for
baseload gas brought about by the introduction of the interconnector. The
change in booking gas capacity was intended to deliver more certainty in
relation to cost recovery for the gas transmission line owner. According to one
industry response (Fullam, 2013) to CER/13/112, the CER’s consultation
document on this issue, the cumulative effect of changes in gas transmission
tariffs for 2013 was a 35.8% increase in transmission tariffs over 2012 levels
and had ‘adversely impacted the cost competitiveness of Irish business’.
Had EirGrid factored into their analysis that if the EWIC were not in place,
Bord Gais would have continued to recover revenues sufficiently and the old
regulations would have held, the EWIC OFF scenario would have returned
lower SMPs than were predicted.
The impact of this change in assumptions on the final results could be
estimated by looking at the difference between baseload, mid merit and
peaking gas plant pre October 2013 and then again post 2014. Unfortunately
this was beyond the scope of this project due to time constraints.
2. Solver Choice
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This software used to solve SEM problems in the SEM is largely seen as ‘black
box’ technology where commercial and technical data of participating
generators is input and market schedules and prices are output.
The Lagrangian Relaxation (LR) method is most commonly applied to solve
unit commitment problems in the SEM. However SEMO have also developed a
secondary solver for determining the Market Schedules and SMPs known as
Mixed Integer Programming (MIP). MIP was originally designed as a back-up
for LR and produces slightly different results –with the trend being that MIR
returns slightly lower SMPs
For simplicity, LR was applied uniformly when building the EWIC OFF model.
This however does not reflect the reality where MIP solving is being used
more and more frequently due to the increasingly complex nature of the
market.
Had MIP been factored in for a number of the days we can assume that the
EWIC OFF scenario would have yielded slightly lower results for SMP and the
measured impact of the Interconnector would have been slightly lower.
3. Time Weighted Vs Volume Weighted.
Energy prices are normally quoted as time weighted figures in the market.
This study calculated volume weighted SMP which can vary slightly from time
weighted SMP (sometimes higher, sometimes lower). This factor may have
had a minor impact on the accuracy of results and is not the standard quote
of energy price in the market.
In summary, EirGrid’s conclusion that the EWIC has reduced the wholesale
price of electricity in Ireland appears to be correct however, when the
assumptions are considered more closely, particularly with respect to the
bidding pattern of generators, it becomes clear that the extent to which it is
doing so (9%) may be over-estimated.
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6.5 Are the Interconnectors helping us to achieve our Renewables
Targets?
As discussed in the literature review, the majority of reports pre EWIC and
many reports post EWIC, indicated that a key benefit of increased
interconnection would be increased utilisation of wind. Whereby increased
interconnection would allow Ireland to export wind during high wind periods
and import power from Britain when wind levels were low; ‘In order to ensure
wind is not unduly curtailed off the system, interconnection is of vital
importance’ (Gorecki, 2011).
As illustrated in section 6.2, actual commercial interconnector flows have not
been responsive to wind.
Additionally, European Legislation requires that Interconnection ‘should be
facilitated as far as possible’ as not to do so could otherwise constitute an
obstacle to trade. This means that Interconnector schedules are not reoptimised by the TSOs i.e. consideration is not given to security of supply or
transmission constraint requirements with respect to the interconnector
(EirGrid, 2014). In certain circumstances this may lead to constraint of wind
generators in favour of imported electricity. The wind industry has registered
their discontent with this, claiming that ‘An interconnector should be treated
as a conventional generator, i.e. the priority dispatch of renewables should
result in the “bumping” off of an importing interconnector (Irish Wind Energy
Association, 2009).’
To counteract this effect, the Transmission System Operator has intervened
by engaging in ‘Counter Trading’ across Moyle and EWIC as described in
Section 3.4.4.
Cumulative TSO Flows as a percentage of Total Interconnector Flows are
illustrated in Figure 6.18.
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Figure 6.20 Breakdown of Total Interconnector Flows for June 2014

As shown, Interconnector Flows corresponded to 14% of exports from the
SEM and just 0.08% of imported flows. By graphing wind data against TSO
Counter trades (Figure 6.21) we can see where the Transmission System
Operator utilised this option.

Figure 6.21 TSO Counter Flows Vs Wind Forecast and Actual Wind Generation, June
2014. Note, a filter has been applied to illustrate just TSO Metered Generation, thus
‘Sum of Metered Generation’ refers to these flows only.
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When we factor in price differentials between GB and AI, as illustrated in
Figure 6.22, we see that TSO exports often occurred when the prices in the
SEM were lower. The fact that these opportunities were not captured by
commercial Interconnector Users and intervention was required by the TSO to
prevent curtailment suggests again that trading is not optimal.

Figure 6.22 TSO Trading Vs Wind and Price Difference (SMP and apx in €)
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7 Conclusion
In this final chapter, the research findings described in Chapter 6 are
summarised, limitations are listed and recommendations for further research
are presented.
7.1 Research Findings
Taking account of the results and discussion presented in Chapter 6, and the
qualifications applying to the assumptions made, the conclusions of this
study, which contribute to the aims and objectives listed in Chapter 1 are
that;
1. Assumption around economic trading across electricity interconnectors
do not reflect the behaviour in the real market to date.
2. There are a number of reasons for this, related to other risks to which
the market participants are exposed; in particular, with regard to
uncertainty around the firmness of price in real time in the SEM.
3. The East West Interconnector has reduced System Marginal Price in the
SEM but this study indicates it may not have done so to the extent
reported by EirGrid in their 2014 analysis.
4. The TSO has resorted to proxy trading to facilitate renewable
generation in the absence of the commercial incentives to do so. This
could be interpreted as a symptom of uneconomic use of the
interconnector and an indication of potential barriers to efficient trade.
5. The redesign of SEM to comply with the European Target Model risks
further distortion to trading if the lessons from experience to date are
not adequately addressed in this process.

7.2 Limitations
As discussed in section 1.4, and throughout Chapter 6, this thesis was
constrained by a number of limitations with respect to time, software, data
availability and number of interviews undertaken.
With regard to software, use of the market modelling package PLEXOS would
have enabled more detailed analysis.
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In relation to data, assumptions had to be made to derive wholesale price; in
the case of the SEM, the final wholesale prices including constraints and
capacity payments were not available. GB prices had to be determined by
reference to a price exchange.
As outlined in section 1.4, the sample of interviews taken was not fully
representative of all parties associated with the interconnector. As a result
they had the potential to be biased although enquires were constructed to
minimise this possibility.
7.3 Recommendations for Future Research
Chapter 6 clearly indicates that there is scope for future research to obtain a
more in-depth understanding of trading behaviours across the Interconnector
and barriers to its efficient utilisation with a view to identifying the best
solutions to implement as part of I-SEM.
This may include but are not limited to;


Undertaking a more comprehensive stakeholder survey to assess the
motivation behind current trading strategies and the resistance or
willingness to engage in arbitrage trading.



Updating the EirGrid Analysis based the recommendations regarding
assumptions in sections 6.4.1



Utilisation of Plexos to assess interconnector flows in response to more
accurate estimations of price differentials between GB and the SEM.
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Appendix A : Registered Interconnector Units as of 05/07/2014
Associated Account

Unit ID

Unit Name

Unit Type

IA_NIMOYLE_I_NIMOYLE

Moyle Interconnector Error Unit

Interconnector
Unit

Error

IA_NIMOYLE_Interconnector Administrator

IA_RIEWIC_I_RIEWIC

EWIC Interconnector Error Unit

Interconnector
Unit

Error

IA_RIEWIC_EirGrid PLC_Interconnector Administrator
IA_NIMOYLE_Interconnector Administrator

IA_NIMOYLE_I_NIMOYLE_IRCU

Moyle Interconnector Residual Capacity
Unit

Interconnector Residual
Capacity Unit

TSO_EIRGRID

IA_RIEWIC_I_RIEWIC_IRCU

EWIC Interconnector Residual Capacity
Unit

Interconnector Residual
Capacity Unit

PT_400021_Airtricity Ltd (Generation)

PT_400021_I_RIEWIC

Airtricity Limited

Interconnector Unit

PT_500021_Airtricity Energy Supply NI Ltd Generation

PT_500021_I_NIMOYLE

Interconnector Unit

Interconnector Unit

PT_400099_Bord Gáis

PT_400099_I_RIEWIC

Bord Gáis

Interconnector Unit

PT_500037_Bord Gais Interconnector (NI)

PT_500037_I_NIMOYLE

Interconnector Unit

Interconnector Unit

PT_500024_Coolkeeragh ESB Ltd (Generator)

PT_500024_I_NIMOYLE

Interconnector Unit

Interconnector Unit

PT_400030_ESB PGEN

PT_400030_I_RIEWIC

ESB PGEN EWIC

Interconnector Unit

PT_500026_I_NIMOYLE

Interconnector Unit

Interconnector Unit

PT_500027_NIE Power Procurement Business

PT_500027_I_NIMOYLE

Interconnector Unit

Interconnector Unit

PT_500034_NIE Supply Generation

PT_500034_I_NIMOYLE

Interconnector Unit

Interconnector Unit

PT_500031_Viridian Energy Supply Ltd

PT_500031_I_NIMOYLE

Interconnector Unit

Interconnector Unit

PT_500026_ESB
Interconnector

Independent

Energy

NI

1

PT_400115_Viridian Energy Supply Limited

PT_400115_I_RIEWIC

Viridian Eeergy Supply Limited - EWIC

Interconnector Unit

PT_500042_Scottish Power Energy Management Ltd

PT_500042_I_NIMOYLE

Scottish Power Energy Management Ltd

Interconnector Unit

PT_500051_I_NIMOYLE

Endessa Interconnector Unit

Interconnector Unit

PT_500072_I_NIMOYLE

SSE Generation Ireland
Interconnector Unit

PT_400096_ElectroRoute Energy Trading

PT_400096_I_RIEWIC

ElectroRoute Energy Trading

Interconnector Unit

PT_500059_ElectroRoute Energy Trading

PT_500059_I_NIMOYLE

ElectroRoute Energy Trading Ltd

Interconnector Unit

PT_500069_ElectroRoute Energy Trading

PT_500069_I_NIMOYLE

ElectroRoute Energy Trading Ltd

Interconnector Unit

PT_400113_RWE Supply & Trading GmbH

PT_400113_I_RIEWIC

RWE Supply & Trading GmbH

Interconnector Unit

PT_500058_RWE Supply and Trading GmbH

PT_500058_I_NIMOYLE

RWE Supply & Trading GmbH

Interconnector Unit

PT_400114_Endesa Generación

PT_400114_I_RIEWIC

Endesa Generación EWIC

Interconnector Unit

PT_500071_Endesa Generación

PT_500071_I_NIMOYLE

Endesa Generación MOYLE

Interconnector Unit

PT_400108_Danske Commodities A/S

PT_400108_I_RIEWIC

Danske Commodities A/S

Interconnector Unit

PT_500070_Danske Commodities A/S

PT_500070_I_NIMOYLE

Danske Commodities A/S

Interconnector Unit

PT_400136_Cenergise Limited

PT_400136_I_RIEWIC

Cenergise Limited - EWIC

Interconnector Unit

PT_500075_Cenergise Limited

PT_500075_I_NIMOYLE

Cenergise Ltd MOYLE

Interconnector Unit

PT_500051_SSE
Interconnector

Generation

PT_500072_SSE
Interconnector

Generation

Ireland
Ireland

Limited
Limited

-

Limited

Interconnector Unit
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Appendix B : Overview of I-SEM Options, Source (SEM
Committee, 2014)
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Appendix C : Thesis Aims, Objectives and Methodology
Aims
1.
flows

Examine
between

Objectives

interconnector
the

SEM/All-

island (AI) and BETTA markets

1a.

organise

1a i. All Island System Load, Wind Generation, Interconnector Flow, APX

analyse

SEMO

RPD and SMP data for June 2014 were graphed over time using a pivot

Interconnector

Flow

and

Collect,

Methodology

chart and analysed.

Data to identify trends
and

1a ii. MIUN data for one full year (June 2013 – June 2014) was compiled

direction over time and

and cumulative flows for each gate window in both the SEM to BETTA

by type of trade.

and BETTA to SEM direction were calculated. The results were presented

in

volumes

in tabular, pie chart and bar chart form to illustrate clearly the overall
distribution and trends emerging over time.
1b.

Identify

trading

1b i. Each MIUN value was matched with its associated Interconnector

patterns and strategies

User. This was achieved by comparing Unit ID columns in the MIUN data

of Interconnector Users

set with those in the Registered Units dataset and employing a Vlookup.
Using the filtering feature available in excel Pivot Tables, the Modified
Interconnector Unit Nomination (MIUN) data for each Interconnector
User over the full year could be presented separately allowing trading
patterns to be identified.
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2. Determine
actual

utilisation

interconnectors;
with

whether the
of

the

corresponds

pre-interconnector

delivery projections;

2a.

Compare

with

findings

2a i. Compare results with findings from literature review.

assumptions

underpinning

previous

studies.
2b.

Assess

whether

EWIC is reducing SMP

2b i. A simplified analysis was designed to compare the estimated cost of
net energy imports for June 2014 with the theoretical amount it would
have cost us to produce this energy at home were the interconnectors
not available.
2b ii. The margin of error for EirGrid’s 2014 analysis was estimated by
examining the assumptions and determining their accuracy via literature
review and interviews with market participants.

2c.

Assess

whether

EWIC is helping us to
achieve

renewable

targets

3a. Analyse results and

variances

determine

have

arisen

under the current SEM market

responsiveness to wind could be determined.
The impact of TSO counter trades was determined by comparing

TSO

counter flows with wind data

3. Consider the reasons for any
that

2c i. Using findings from the analysis of Interconnector User behaviour,

3a i. Compare results with findings from literature review.

whether

there is a connection
between the difference
5

arrangements

and

lessons can

be

terms

developing

of

what

provided in
the

in

assumed

patterns

and

trading
the

differences in results.

revised I-SEM market

6

